28 June 2006
Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: irreconcilably divided and mutually hostile? One could be forgiven for thinking so, after the publication of a recent public opinion poll suggesting that Turkish society remains polarized when it comes to religio-political matters.
The poll research, conducted by two of Istanbul's leading foundation universities and published in the Radikal newspaper, found that three-fifths of Turks attributed failure in life to a lack of religious faith. The findings further suggested that with respect to the key secular benchmark banning women from wearing headscarves in public buildings, two-thirds of the population favored its complete reversal.
The revelation of such attitudes is likely to play badly with an embattled secularist establishment, already reeling from the recent slaying of a State Council judge by a murderous fanatic. The aftermath of the shocking deed was characterized by recrimination, tension and a fear of further violence. Assuming that this was the intention of the assassin in committing the act, Turkey has come alarmingly close to falling into the trap that has seemingly been set for it. Yet, one has to ask, Does it have to be like this?
Faced with a profound shock or tragedy, human beings invariably cast around for the reassurance of familiar and cherished certainties. In other words they revert to first principles. The first principles that many thousands of people looked to after the murder of Judge Mustafa Yucel Ozbilgin took them to the mausoleum of the country's founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, at Anat Kabir. In doing so, they publicly renewed their vows to the secularism that many believed had come under physical attack. Equally importantly, the collective act of such a large crowd amounted to a group rejection of the attempt at mass intimidation.
If these twin values, of secularism and of a society free from intimidation, are central to the functioning of contemporary Turkish political life, it has to be admitted that alone they are insufficient. The mass visit to Anat Kabir may have been tantamount to a comfort blanket for secular Turks, but the clock can hardly be turned back to the 1930s. For many, especially from the peripheries of society, Islam is, as the recent survey suggested, an integral part of their contemporary identity as Turks. Therefore, there has to be some way to reconcile secularism and Islam in public life.
It may be a surprise to say so in the current highly charged atmosphere, but the best point of departure would be Turkey's recent track record. We need to remind ourselves that practical results in accommodating secularism and Islam have not been at all bad over the last three and a half years. The basis on which this has been achieved has been a rough and ready balance between the secular state and the Islamist government. The secret of this equilibrium has been the de facto mutual respect, admittedly grudging, shown by the two sides toward one another. The state has shown wary respect for the government, based on its electoral landslide victory achieved in November 2002. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has, in turn, shown a cautious respect for the state, based on the organized power still at its disposal.
The outcome of this situation has been a rough parity with which both sides have been able to live. The AKP's electoral success has enabled it to govern Turkey, and to take the policy lead, from new thinking on the Cyprus issue to a leadership role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. At the same time the checks and balances provided by state institutions like the presidency have prevented an AKP tyranny of the majority, notably in moderating an Islamist agenda over such issues as the sale of alcohol, and helping to resist widespread nepotism in public appointments.
Indeed, one could even go so far as to argue that a political balance at the heart of the Turkish Republic, though hardly pretty and always vulnerable to the charge of ideological incoherence, has at important moments delivered the best of both worlds. Turkey's rejection of playing a major role in the Iraq war in 2003 was all the more credible because it was supported by government and state alike. Likewise, the AKP has invigorated relations with states in the Middle East, like Syria, without the sacrifice of close relations, especially in the security field, with Israel.
The robustness of this policy output between 2002 and 2005 is in danger of being overwhelmed by the grief felt for the murdered judge. This is understandable, but ultimately unhelpful, especially with a year to go before current political uncertainties are resolved through the double election for president and Parliament. Elections are a useful mechanism for the orderly transfer of power; but two such pivotal elections in such a short space of time, where either could radically alter the course on which the country is set, is too much of a good thing. In the future, Turkey needs to stagger its major elections. A coup by the ballot box is still a coup.
What will serve Turkey best over the next 18 months is a firming of the tacit understanding regarding the division of office holders. The presidency, as balancer of governments, must remain in the hands of a Kemalist figure with backbone and integrity. That will help to allay the concerns of secularists if, as expected, the AKP is voted back into office.
Beyond that, there must be a collective reassertion of other first principles, especially those associated with liberal democracy. This should include the unacceptability of the use of violence in the political process, whether in the State Council or in the Kurdish southeast; the arrest and prosecution of individuals and fringe groups conspiring to use violence for political ends; the further development of a democratic process based on inclusivity, which reduces the incentive to subvert or challenge the political system as a whole.
Soon after the State Council outrage, Greek and Turkish warplanes tangled over the Aegean Sea. The scene was set for a precipitous decline in bilateral relations fueled by almost two centuries of enmity and distrust. In fact, it didn't happen. Both sides acted responsibly, government and media included. The crisis was contained and the tension defused. This latest chapter in Greek-Turkish relations shows that conflict is not inevitable. It is timely to insist that the same apply between Turkish secularism and Islamism. The polarization so graphically demonstrated in the latest public opinion poll must not be allowed to fester.
Philip Robins is a lecturer in politics at the University of Oxford and a fellow of St Antony's College. A translation of his "Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War" (University of Washington Press) will be published in Turkey this summer by Arkadas. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
