While the international community saw Libyans collectively rise up against the rule of Moammar Gaddafi and saw the emergence of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the unifying force, the reality on the ground is quite different.
A new study by the International Crisis Group (ICG) brings into sharp focus the rivalries, the complexities and the number of militias, groups, and secular and religious parties that have come to the fore and are jostling for attention and representation in the new Libya.
The study also paints a fascinating picture of how the various towns and groups rose, often quite separately from each other, during the civil war in their united hatred for the Colonel's brutal 40-year rule.
Anywhere between 100 to 300 militia groups are based in the country's cities and towns, and close to 125,000 Libyans are said to be armed.
"The groups do not see themselves as serving a central authority; they have separate procedures to register members and weapons, arrest and detain suspects; they repeatedly have clashed," says the ICG in a report on the country.
Rebuilding Libya requires addressing their fate, yet haste would be as perilous as apathy. The uprising was highly decentralised; and although they recognise it, the local military and civilian councils are sceptical of the NTC, the largely self-appointed body leading the transition.
"They feel they need weapons to defend their interests and address their security fears," the report notes.
NTC'S RULE
Disarming them will take some doing, given their distrust of the NTC led by Mahmoud Jibril, who became the face of the revolution to the international community, much to the dismay of many Libyans.
Many Libyans worry about Mr. Jibril's ties with the previous regime. Under Gaddafi, he was in charge of the semi-independent National Economic Development Board, which was tied to reform efforts undertaken by Saif al-
Islam, Gaddafi's most influential son.
While his early defection was appreciated, his political background began to count against him, notes the ICG Report. His apparent secular outlook rankled Islamists, while his prominent position under Saif al-Islam irked those who aspired to a more thorough upending of the so-called old order.
A member of the 17 February Coalition told the ICG: "He said he was one of the 'experts' who worked for Qadhafi. Our view was that their only expertise was in saying 'yes' to Qadhafi. They were experts in stealing Libyan money and hiding what Qadhafi was doing. They were in their position because of their loyalty to him".
Jibril has also been in the crosshairs of Islamists, of which there are a fair few. The very well-respected and influential Islamic scholar Ali Sallabi has criticised the NTC for "extremist secularist views", adding that "the role of the executive committee is no longer required because they are remnants of the old regime. They should all resign, starting from the head of the pyramid all the way down ... they are guiding Libya towards a new era of tyranny and dictatorship" clear that Islam would be respected in the new Libya, and no laws would go against our religion".
Islamist have also criticised the NTC for painting them in an extremist light to the outside world.
Mr. Sallabi also accused some NTC figures of telling wary Westerners that he, along with Abdul Hakim Belhaj - head of Tripoli Military Council - harboured hidden agendas. Both are said to be backed by Qatari government. "They claimed that we have extremist Islamic views and agendas and said the West should be cautious in dealing with us. These allegations are entirely false and could have negative repercussions", Mr Sallabi has reportedly said to the media in recent months.
Mr. Sallabi has recently risen to prominence in the international community, partially because he is backed by Qatar, which played a prominent military, diplomatic and financial role in eliminating Gaddafi's regime.
But he has also had a strong record of opposing Gaddafi, having been in a Libyan prison for eight years and wields tremendous influence in the country.
For now both the religious parties and the NTC have toned down their rhetoric, but these could break out once again.
Mr. Sallabi is not the only rival to Mr. Jibril's NTC. There are a few other prominent group that will no doubt be keen to play a role in the new Libya and protect their own interests.
These include:
The National Army, which was formed by officers that defected from the former Libyan National Army in February 2011. It is not 'national', but primarily represents soldiers from the east.
From the outset, the army's leadership was dogged by infighting and accusations of cowardice from civilian militias that bore the brunt of casualties. Since relocating to Tripoli immediately after its liberation, the army has sought to assert its authority there, albeit with at best mixed success, says the ICG.
The Tripoli Military Council, led by Abdul Hakim Belhaj, oversees eleven different brigades. There are eleven corresponding members on the council, each with a separate headquarters. Most of its fighters are from the capital. Belhaj has been criticised for receiving Qatari funding after the fall of Tripoli.
One of these brigades is led by Belhaj himself; a Tripoli brigade source reported that it is exclusive, recruiting talent from across a variety of militias and possessing its own warrant system and administrative authority. One of the larger Tripoli brigades, comprising some 3,000 fighters, is headed by Mehdi al-Harati; among its fighters are some expatriates who returned in March. There is some contention as to how Al-Harati has been sidelined and how Belhaj has rose to prominence, despite his Islamist credentials and suspicions of his backing by Qatar and high media profile over the past few months.
The Western Military Council, established during the western mountains campaign, aimed to coordinate efforts by the militias that had emerged in the area. The council claims to to control some 140 military councils and an area of operations stretching from the Tunisian border to Misrata, according to the ICG report.
The Misratan Military Council grew out of the small cells of Misratan youth formed to resist the regime forces. While they lack major funding they have been credited for their sheer bravery but are a loose coalition of various brigades.
Some of these factions have already had skirmishes with each other as they wrest control and assert their authority in the new country.
"Competition between security forces has had various implications on the ground. These have been most visible in Tripoli, given the speed with which and manner in which the city fell - a popular uprising from within combined with a rush of irregular rebel brigades from without, supported by NATO bombing from the skies; the ensuing security void; and the overlapping presence and uncertain division of responsibility among units that stepped in," says the ICG.
Rebel militias competed over responsibility, and their relations were plagued by mistrust, a situation that often tipped over into inter-militia violence; at the same time, they rejected central leadership and authority from either the NTC or its National Army. This has led not only to clashes, but also to the erection of parallel, independent systems for policing, detention and the meting out of justice (or retribution), says the ICG.
A CALL TO DISARM
In principle, there is little dispute among brigade commanders and political leaders on the need to unite the security forces and bring them under the authority of a single, credible national authority. As stated by the head of the Tripoli brigades, Mehdi al-Harati, "In the future, almost all the thuwwar (revolutionaries) wish to come under the National Army's umbrella".
Similar sentiments were echoed by the commander of Zintan's Mohammad al- Madani Brigade and Misratan rebels returning from the frontline in Sirte. Translating such abstract sentiments into concrete action is a different matter.
Most groups have also said that they will not disarm before the parliamentary elections in June 2012.
However, the new cabinet appears to enjoy greater political support than its predecessor, primarily because many of the leading ministers are part of the new Libyan revolutionary order.
Led by the Prime Minister Abdur Rahim Al-Keeb, who was very active among Tripli rebel networks and invested much personally in the uprising, providing him with real credibility and a strong support base in the capital.
"Likewise, the new defence and interior ministers hail from Zintan and Misrata respectively, and thus might be able to enhance cooperation between regions and bolster the NTC's legitimacy," says the ICG.
© alifarabia.com 2012
