Walking the Line - Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon

04 February 2009

REPORT

Editor's note: The following is Part One of the executive summary of a report commissioned by Germany's Heinrich Boll Foundation and several other NGOs on how to successfully engage in peacebuilding in Lebanon.

After the 2006 war in Lebanon and the ensuing political deadlock and escalation throughout 2007, FriEnt member organisations expressed the need for a more thorough understanding of the conflict and peacebuilding context and for reflection on options for peacebuilding by German development and peace organisations. As a result, the Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung (hbs), the German Development Service (DED), the Forum Civil Peace Service (forumZFD) and the Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt) jointly commissioned a study whose objective is twofold:

1. To identify relevant fields of activity for peacebuilding by German development and peace organisations;

2. To identify potentials, deficits and needs of existing approaches and give recommendations for coordination with Lebanese and international actors in order to strengthen coherence and relevance of peacebuilding activities.

The concept and methodology of this study stem from state-of-the-art tools for conflict analysis and the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) approach. Starting from a systemic conflict analysis, the study looks into structural challenges, core problems and escalating factors and evaluates their relevance by analysing how their varying reciprocal impacts may foster and enable conflict and the use of violence in Lebanon. Based on this analysis, the study identifies strategical entry points and discusses main challenges, stakeholders, and peacebuilding needs in selected fields of activity. Existing approaches by Lebanese and international actors are assessed and gaps and opportunities to foster peacebuilding identified.

A Country without a State?

Structural Challenges and Conflicts in Lebanon

Notwithstanding the current dynamics, this study sets out from the premise that the current conflict cannot be seen in isolation and reduced to the immediate political questions. It rather posits that these are but the latest manifestations of deeper structural challenges rooted in the make-up of the Lebanese state and society. This study particularly identifies five structural challenges as most relevant: (1) conflicting concepts of national identity, (2) the involvement in major regional and international conflicts, (3) the consociational political system, (4) an inequitable economic system, and (5) the patriarchal value system.

While Lebanon's structural challenges tend to be stable and changeable only over time, they manifest themselves in several clusters of core problems which lead to conflicts in Lebanese society and hamper its ability to peacefully manage contradictory interests. The study identifies 11 core problems leading to conflict which manifest themselves in variable degrees in the political, economical and societal sphere.

Politics - The Pitfalls of a Consociational Democracy

In order to alleviate fears of domination, the Lebanese political system provides for an intricate system of power-sharing ("consociational democracy") that distributes positions and executive competences among the major sectarian communities. A broad consensus is typically required, as major players have a multitude of options to stall the system. This limitation on the principle of majority decision-making leads to a mostly dysfunctional political system that carries the permanent potential of a breakdown once conflicts arise for which no compromise seems possible.

As state resources are distributed according to sectarian and regional quotas represented by a narrow elite of political leaders, these leaders wield extensive control over such resources, sustaining a system of clientelism. These networks of dependence translate directly into electoral support. They also provide powerful motivation for loyalty that can be mobilised during times of conflict.

Partly as a result of extensive networks of clientelism, the Lebanese state remains largely unable to extend the reach of its institutions or enforce its own laws. For most of its history Lebanon has been governed by a tacit understanding that engagement in "classic" public sectors should be minimal. Instead, such prerogatives were largely taken over by the sectarian communities. In addition, the existence of powerfully armed non-state actors implies that the state is unable to monopolise the use of force both internally and externally.

Through its location at the fault-line of the Arab-Israeli conflict, its inability to exert effective state power and the tendency of its political leaders to seek foreign support, Lebanon invites foreign intervention and has been repeatedly turned into a theatre for proxy wars - both politically and militarily.

At the same time, sectarian leaders are actors with their own agenda of maximising their influence. However, only with substantial outside support can they reasonably hope to tilt the internal balance of power. Conflating foreign policy choices with sectarian identities for the purpose of political mobilisation, political patrons invest the struggle over such choices with the full weight of a history rife with violence and allow mobilisation to draw upon deep layers of emotion and vengeance. External military support to both sides and the proliferation of weapons outside the official security forces fuel a cycle of mutual fear perceptions and the build-up of protomilitias which can be converted into fully-fledged fighting forces at short notice and themselves serve as possible triggers for violence.

In addition to these challenges, Lebanon is host to more than 400,000 Palestinian refugees, half of which live in camps that have become a fertile ground for radical groups, in particular Sunni Islamists. Since the internal Palestinian conflict mirrors the internal Lebanese conflict, there is the potential that Palestinian groups may be dragged into the Lebanese conflict, resulting in Palestinian infighting that may spill over to involve Lebanese.

Society - Worlds Apart

Sectarian identifications are essential parameters by which Lebanese citizens orient and interpret behaviour, and political orientations are likewise largely a function of sectarian identities, whereas political parties lost most of their substance during the civil war. Consequently, and while sectarian sentiment can appear dormant and subdued during times of elite consensus, any serious political conflict will invariably be cast as a contest of power between sectarian communities, thus becoming infused with the full historical weight of conflict, violence and the resulting mutual fear perceptions.

In addition, the territorialisation of sectarian identities partly wrought by civil war displacement and "sectarian cleansing" leads to the identification of certain areas with individual sects, enabling scenarios and perceptions of "defence" of territory that serve as pretexts and rallying points for sectarian mobilisation and creating triggers for the eventual outbreak of violence. This sectarian structuring of the public sphere is to some extent a symptom of the conflict, but it has become an accelerator over time and now plays a significant role in the build-up of conflict in Lebanon.

The persistence of sectarianism in Lebanon is guaranteed by an education system that is strongly segregated, in particular for the lower income classes who largely rely on education provided by the sectarian communities, and clientelism, as well as a dysfunctional political system and the lack of a credible state monopoly that renders clientelist networks defined by sect the only recourse when support is needed. Yet sectarian attitudes do not themselves initiate conflict. Rather, such sentiment is mobilised and refreshed by sectarian leaders according to political expediency and framed as defence against the purported ambitions of other communities, drawing on past atrocities and current demographic fears.

Another aspect in this social construction of a "sectarian" reality is the fact that Lebanese citizens are confronted with the continuous presence and prominence of leaders with a record of responsibility for wartime atrocities. The occurrence of some instances of enforced accountability that are easily portrayed as politically motivated enforces "closing of the ranks" in defence of leaders implicated in atrocities.

Economy - The Continuation of Clientelistic Politics

The Lebanese economy is dominated by a small number of powerful players who sometimes wield virtual monopolies, stifling competition and driving prices significantly above regional standards. Combined with the ongoing economic stagnation, a growing part of the lower middle classes is facing increasing economic difficulties, which enhances the power of clientelist support systems. In addition, a long tradition of neglect of peripheral areas that continued in the reconstruction phase of the 1990s has created pronounced patterns of uneven development. These inequalities have resulted in large populations of migrants in low-income areas of the capital where experience of real and relative deprivation is easily mustered into political and sectarian resentment.

Relative deprivation and economic stagnation produce a large reservoir of resentful and/or unemployed youth with ample time and motivation to wreak havoc and/or join proto-militias. The identification of state support, social advancement and welfare with sectarian belonging also invests social conflict and the struggle over economic strategies with a strong sectarian dimension.

Controversial steps towards reform pushed through by the government may be among the triggers for loyalty conflicts, evolving into larger protests and, potentially, clashes. More likely, however, social and economic grievances and grudges will be instrumentalised by political players to score political points and deliver political messages, or genuine social protest may be hijacked for the same purpose. The most likely scenario appears to be mass mobilisation, ostensibly for the sake of social issues but charged with strong sectarian undertones, which, due to the terntorialisation of sectarian identities, will solicit violent reactions from adjacent communities and ignite sectarian clashes, in particular between Sunnis and Shiites in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Foreign Aid in Lebanon

Foreign aid in post-war Lebanon moved from reconstruction (1992-1997) towards supporting financial stability and balance-of-payments equilibrium. In 2001 and 2002, two donor conferences (Paris I and II) addressed the growing public debt and lagging economy and came up with a Lebanese reform programme, averted a financial crisis and laid the foundations for economic recovery. This strategic shift helped to avoid financial and currency crises and maintain the necessary confidence of national and foreign investors to provide loans for public debt restructuring; however, it reduced the already faltering resources for reconstruction. It was not until the end of 2004 that the 1992-97 plans for the physical and productive sectors were fulfilled, whereas in the social sectors only 50 % of the original expenditures were achieved.

After the July 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the Stockholm conference promised a total of 980 million dollars for humanitarian assistance and post-war early recovery based on the National Plan for Early Reconstruction Needs. This conference was followed by the 2007 Paris III conference which raised around 7.6 billion dollars of pledges and focused on providing direct support for the post-war reconstruction plan, securing cash for debt service, and covering the budgetary deficit. The government proposed a renewed socio-economic reform programme including privatisation, tax increases, labour law reform, and reforms of the social security system. Until June 2008, 63 % of pledges made at the conference were signed into agreements, with donors focusing on power, security, water and wastewater, transportation, and social sectors as well as administrative reforms, privatisation, and private sector support. Among the main donors are the European Investment Bank (EIB), Saudi Arabia, the World Bank, the United States, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), France, the European Commission, Italy and Germany.

Although donors acknowledge existing political impediments to successful and sustainable reform, the amount of funds allocated to political reform programmes is comparatively low. Probably the most important actor with substantial political reform objectives is the European Union. The National Indicative Programme 2007- 2010 with a total amount of U187 million allocates 11.8 % to judicial and prison reform and to political reform, with the latter supporting - among other things - electoral law reform, the National Action Plan on respect for human rights, and initiatives that promote social inclusion. However, the results have been mixed so far. Most initiatives have been greatly hampered by the political crisis and activities confined to administrative and technical issues instead of targeting the root causes of lacking state capacity and state accountability.

Aid coordination mechanisms set up after the war in 2006 were rather insufficient because of the political stalemate, competing donor agendas, as well as the fast influx of money - and humanitarian organisations. The opposing foreign policy orientations are reflected in different funding partners - with Western donors supporting the government and the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon financing reconstruction efforts by Hizbullah - as well as parallel structures for the planning and implementation of projects established by the government (Council for Development and Reconstruction, Ministry of Finance) and Hizbullah (Jihad alBina'a, Wa'd) respectively. The politicisation of aid led to a real (or sometimes perceived) "territorialisation" of aid and created conflicts over available resources in local communities in the South.

Civil Society

Civil Society is a mirror of the social, political and confessional divide in Lebanon. Even though there was a significant growth of secular, general-interest-based CSOs during the civil war and throughout the 1990s, most organisations are identity- based and rooted in clan, sectarian or religious structures. While there is a good to high level of education and professional experience in carrying out training, advocacy and campaigning, there is still a lack of organisational sustainability and internal democratic practice, and few of the mostly Beirut-based CSOs reach out to rural areas.

There are some good examples of foreign actors supporting issue-based and advocacy CSOs with the aim of establishing networks of shared interest among citizens based on social conditions rather than origin and sectarian communities. However, most international donors trying to strengthen civil society focus on general capacity-building of NGOs and to a lesser extent on fostering their watchdog function and independent role vis--vis the political system and sectarian groups. Moreover, electoral reform and election monitoring have been high on Western donor agendas' since 2005, which has not only led to over-funding of this sector and a decline in voluntarism, but also to CSO5 getting absorbed in technical issues rather than developing a political agenda.

Getting Engaged

Against the background of this analysis, four fields of activity for development and peacebuilding organisations were identified. Approaches to conflict transformation in these fields do not only allow to address core problems leading to conflict in Lebanon, but they also provide opportunities to foster the neutrality of public services and of existing structures and institutions which balance and coordinate conflicting interests in society as well as to strengthen an overall Lebanese identity at the expense of sectarian- and group-based orientations. Moreover, the forth field offers entry points to contribute to immediate violence prevention.

Education and Dialogue

In Lebanon, social and sectarian-based divisions within society are reinforced by the education system with its rather weak public and traditionally strong and growing private education sector. This dichotomy mirrors the overall weakness of state institutions dominated by the strong sectarian-based patronage system.

In order to restore credibility in the public education system and to facilitate the national reconciliation process after the civil war, the Ministry of Education, in cooperation with civil society organisations, launched various initiatives in the 1990s, albeit with mixed impact. There is little interest on the part of the richer section of the population and elite to engage in reform of the education system and the high percentage of private schools is not seen as an obstacle to the improvement of public schools and thus the improvement of a key citizens' right.

After the summer war in 2006, only 34.6% of schoolchildren were enrolled in state schools. Only a few international organisations like the World Bank have identified education as a priority issue and aim to promote a more inclusive system. However, ideas and experiences to improve quality already exist and the public infrastructure could attract double the number of students with minimal additional costs. Moreover, the Paris III process, although politically sensitive, has inbuilt aid conditional on reform mechanisms, which could be a vehicle to support reforms.

Non-formal education programmes on citizenship, democracy, and conflict resolution and different forms of dialogue activities are widespread in Lebanon. They are mainly funded by international donors and either target children and youth or multipliers within the society. A multitude of Lebanese CSO5 and several universities are engaged in these programmes and there is a large pool of experienced trainers and practitioners. Compared to this, very few initiatives try to facilitate problem- solving dialogue processes between higher-level decision- makers (track 1.5).

Existing dialogue and education initiatives, however, are dominated by a "more people approach" on the grassroots level. They usually lack a strategy which links changes on the individual level with the broader socio-political context and the core problems leading to conflict in Lebanon. Dialogue projects are often not rooted in the space within which conflicts are taking place, and coordination, if existent, is mostly across horizontal lines. This lack of comprehensive strategies for institutionalisation and multiplication on the higher level ("key people") and the political and sectarian polarisation within the broader context render their impact on core problems rather negligible.

Transitional Justice

Building peace in divided societies is a long-term process of re-establishing trust, justice and the rule of law. Over the course of time, different approaches have been developed - ranging from prosecution, lustration and reform of state institutions to truth commissions and reparation programmes. None of these so-called transitional justice mechanisms was applied to deal with the legacy of the civil war in Lebanon, and the prevailing culture of impunity is coupled with divided memories which are part of group identities, reinforcing social segregation. With the establishment of the International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, calls for truth and justice were widespread in Beirut. Yet being an isolated mechanism instead of a comprehensive approach to transitional justice, the Commission was immediately drawn into the conflict between the two governmental blocs and became prone to political instrumentalisation and delegitimisation.

As in other post-conflict societies, where political conditions do not allow for a more comprehensive "dealing with the past" process, one can find several "islands" of transitional justice initiatives in Lebanon. Many of them are taken on by individuals, and some do have organisational structures and resources. In order to overcome the isolation of these initiatives, several organisations have started to build up a network and broaden their approach to transitional justice. Moreover, family associations have collected a great deal of information about the fates of the missing and human rights violations over the past two decades and lobby for their right to know.

Supporting transitional justice processes as external actors needs a multi-layered strategy as well as reflection on the political signals sent by supporting specific initiatives. This is especially true in Lebanon, where only one isolated and contested mechanism, the Hariri Tribunal, receives many resources from international donors, while broader justice concerns are neglected and a comprehensive approach is lacking. In general, few donors support civil society initiatives.

Justice and Rule of Law

In the context of Lebanon, a more independent justice system and the application of the rule of law could be a viable strategy to weaken the patronage that under- pins the confessional system by making it less important for ordinary citizens. Moreover, it would also make clientelist influence-wielding outside the rule of law and the capture of state institutions by the political elites less easy and thus indirectly strengthen state institutions.

While a comprehensive framework for the reform of the judiciary in Lebanon was reviewed by the Ministry of Justice in 2002, its implementation is hindered and largely confined by the executive to technical reforms.

Whereas the overall activities of USAID, UNDP and the European Commission together cover most core elements of judicial reform, a comprehensive programme to strengthen the rule of law is not in place. Mainly due to the political deadlock, training and material support to the judiciary have become the leftovers of an otherwise frozen reform process. In addition, the support provided by the EU und the US to elements of the security sector gives an imbalanced support to law enforcement while the necessary legal control mechanisms are not yet functional enough.

Approaches to strengthen the rule of law should, first of all, develop a strategy to create the necessary support for reforms while carefully building up a reform coalition that includes "allies" from both inside and outside the judiciary. Existing capacity-building activities could then be used as a key entry point to bring together like- minded actors and make stakeholders part of reform designs.

Violence Prevention and Security

The Lebanese security sector suffers the same ills caused by the sectarian-based patronage system which permeates all state institutions. Besides the Lebanese Army, there exist several security apparatuses and services, often with their own intelligence services. Most security institutions enjoy affiliations with one of the sectarian political leadership and the lack of central oversight not only leads to inefficiency but also allows these different structures to be played off against each other in the sectarian distribution game.

These deficiencies of the Lebanese state's monopoly on security are further underlined by the existence of the 12,500-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed in south Lebanon and the existence of several non-state actors: Hizbullah's armed wing and armed Palestinian and Islamic fundamentalist factions as well as growing numbers of private security companies with sectarian- political affiliations and (re-)emerging militias on both sides of the conflict.

While there seems to be a lack of an overarching approach to security system reform, most of the important activities by external actors concentrate on strengthening the security forces with equipment and training, often imbalanced and insensitive to their sectarian affiliations and their possible implication in the political crisis. There are a few, mostly non-governmental actors working to build national competence and networks on SSR in Lebanon as a means to create leverage for the discussion of the topic in the public and political sphere and the development of a long-term reform strategy.

The importance of the Lebanese security sector for crisis prevention and peace- building, though closely tied to the core problems of the political conflict, stems mainly from the high risk of conflict escalation into violent confrontation. Proliferation of arms, increasing acceptance of violence, and emerging 'front lines' in divided public spaces accompany the increasing frequency of violent street clashes. Increasing economic difficulties facilitate recruitment into proto-militias from within areas of disadvantage and Palestinian refugee camps have become safe havens for outlaws and Islamic fundamentalist groups.

In tomorrow's issue: Reccomendations

Copyright The Daily Star 2009.