The US made Turkey an essential partner in its "operating theatres" during the Cold war. First in the Caucasus where they were very efficient helping the Chechens during their first war against the Russians.

Secondly, because the pipeline that would connect the countries bordering the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean would be going through their territory, and would therefore avoid any Russian involvement.

Thirdly in the Balkans, where they were able to deliver weapons that were destined to the Bosnian and Muslim militias while avoiding the UN embargo. And lastly, in Central Asia and during the Gulf War in 1991. It is therefore not at all surprising that the US placed a great deal of pressure on the European Union states, previously quite reticent, to have them accept Turkey's candidature.

Major support

This way, the US would have a major support at the heart of European institutions. But, above all, what took place was the conclusion in 1996, under the aegis of the Americans, of an agreement on strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey.

The latter was of utmost importance. This was the turning point that led to the present situation. This partnership began at a moment when for the first time an Islamic government was coming into power in Ankara, under Prime Minister Erbakan.

It was certainly not what his party, nor the swell of political opinion that he represented, nor the deep political currents of the Turkish public opinion wanted.

But, the army, embodying both the government's and the country's unity, integrity, stability and secularism, and being always present throughout the highest proceedings of the State, had fashioned its fundamental creed out of its very close ties with the American superpower: to effectively impose, as the U.S. asked, the strategic partnership with Israel.

From this, stems the present Turkish tragedy. After a period of trial and error, and the outlawing of Erbakan's party, a compromise was reached and his present successor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who says that he is more of a conservative than an Islamist, implemented the IMF's recommendations, maintained the previous strategic choices in favour of the US and Israel, and limited himself to increasing religious influence in certain sectors of society, particularly in education.

This compromise would have lasted were it not for the onset of war. As one recalls, the American government wanted its army to be able to pass through Turkey in order to get to Baghdad.

Despite the US offering of cash and soft loans, most members of the Turkish Parliament felt unable to stand up to the deep and numerous currents of opinion within the population. A major difference now divided the people from their political masters, whether military or civil.

From this moment, it was imperative for the US to recover the cooperation of Turkey, their irreplaceable ally, and for the Turkish leaders.

Reconciliation was achieved and it was announced that Turkey would be sending a large detachment of troops to Iraq.

Their aim was to take in hand once again the Turcoman minority which, due to its hostility to the Kurdish majority supported by the US, had aligned itself with the Iraqi resistance.

In Ankara it was hoped that this last point would be sufficient in itself to obtain the support of Turkish public opinion.

In Washington they expected an irreversible weakening of the Iraqi resistance in the north of the country, an oil region of major importance.

But all currents of Iraqi political opinion were fiercely opposed to this project and it was provisionally abandoned. But the consequences were considerable. The national Iraqi resistance saw in it a direct threat to its survival and its activities. Armed foreign insurgents coming from the Wahhabis faction, more or less linked to Al Quaida, saw in it the threat of a dangerous confrontation with the Turkish army.

Public opinion

Turkish public opinion, for the most part, saw it as a political about-turn by the government making it party to the American occupation and the Islamic movement saw it as a betrayal by the leaders they had been supporting. In such a climate anything could happen. The time for violent reaction had arrived.

The attacks in Istanbul revealed at one and the same time the diversity and the convergence of the opposition forces. The attack on the synagogues demonstrated the ideology of Al Quaida and those groups close to it.

The attacks on British interests struck at the closest ally of the US at the very moment that London was welcoming President Bush ? We cannot ignore the lesson from the Turkish tragedy. It is the ultimate illustration of the contagious nature of the crises in the region.

The contagion of the war against Iraq and of the dialectic which is unfolding between the occupation and the resistance. The contagion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, involvement in which, poses a grave threat to Turkey.

Only the resolution of these conflicts may give a chance to modern Turkey and to its ties with Europe.

Paul-Marie de La Gorce is a French writer and journalist on Middle East problems and strategic international affairs. This article was translated from the original French by Maritza Lger for Gulf News.

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