The collapse of the recently-formed Palestinian unity government and the emergence of Hamas as the de facto ruling party in the Gaza Strip mark a new watershed in the broken landscape of Palestinian politics. Meanwhile, the USs and EUs support for embattled Palestinian President Mahmud ?Abbas and recognition of the emergency (Fatah-dominated) government have prompted expectations that humanitarian conditions in the West Bank could improve soon. But few observers believe there is any chance of genuine progress, political or economic, while the two statelets are at odds and Hamas is kept on the periphery. Bill Farren-Price reports.
When it came, the collapse of the national unity government, which had brought Hamas and Fatah together in an uncomfortable governing partnership in March, was as spectacular as it was swift. After a week of factional fighting in Gaza that left dozens dead, Hamas fighters took over the presidential compound in Gaza city on the night of 14 June, prompting President 'Abbas in Ramallah to dismiss the government and replace it with an emergency administration led by independent Salam Fayyad. The yielding of Gaza to Hamas and the removal of that movement from the Palestinian government prompted Israel and the US to renew their public support for President 'Abbas and his emergency administration, while the EU and the US announced that they would lift economic and aid embargoes on the Palestinians. The news that aid would once again flow into the Palestinian territories sparked buying on the moribund Palestine Securities Exchange, lifting prices 15%, despite the fact that the growing fissure between Gaza and the West Bank can only set back hopes for long-term political unity and progress in the peace process.
Following the Hamas takeover, Israel instituted a brief economic blockade on the Gaza Strip which prevented the supply of fuel and food, although fuel oil supplies to the power station were maintained. Full fuel supplies were resumed on 18 June after EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg said they would resume normal relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Ministers there said the EU, the largest donor to the Palestinians, would develop the conditions for urgent practical and financial assistance including direct financial support to the government as well as undertaking intensive efforts to build the institutions of the future Palestinian state. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, meanwhile, said the US, which broke off formal contacts with the Palestinian government after Hamas won the January 2006 elections, would resume diplomatic relations with the Palestinians and promised emergency humanitarian aid to Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, for his part, welcomed the new Palestinian administration, describing it as a partner for peace. Following meetings in Washington with President George W Bush, Mr Olmert pledged that Palestinians would start to see real improvements in the West Bank and reaffirmed his commitment to a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Challenge Of Reconciliation
While Israel and Western powers have been quick to renew their support for President 'Abbas, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas presents a considerable challenge. In his first speech since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, President 'Abbas said on 20 June there could be no compromise no dialogue with those killers, as he put it. He added that he would not accept any Israeli attempt to take advantage of this act perpetrated by the coup militias to pave the way for the separation of Gaza and the West Bank. Without a hint of irony, he said Palestinians would restore unity and the homeland in a state based on the pillars of democracy.
Yet even as Western diplomats and the Israeli government have painted Hamas departure from the official government as a step forward, the strategy is fraught with dangers. First, although it may be intellectually convenient for the West to deal with a Fatah-dominated West Bank in an effort to isolate Hamas in Gaza, the West Bank is if anything more politically fractured than the Gaza Strip. Given the considerable support for Hamas in certain areas, some believe there is potential for the West Bank to go the same way as its southern partner, even though Israel, rather than the PA, has responsibility for security there. Second, President 'Abbas support from Israel and the US will inevitably play against him and strengthen those Palestinians who argue he has been co-opted. Hamas electoral success in early 2006 was in large part due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Fatah government and its inability to mount an effective political challenge to Israeli occupation, let alone advance the peace process. Finally, the politics of the West Bank cannot be conducted in isolation from the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian diaspora or the wider Arab world. Any rapprochement between Israel and the new unelected government will fail if it does not at least nominally speak for all Palestinians. Further deterioration of the ceasefire and the full-scale resumption of Hamas attacks against civilians inside Israel would also make it impossible for Israel to engage with President 'Abbas.
Domestic/Regional Implications
So the path ahead for the Palestinian leadership, whether official in the West Bank or unofficial in Gaza, is as difficult as ever. MEES soundings suggest that the Israeli government is unlikely to mount a full-scale military operation against Gaza in the near term. Mindful of the disastrous Lebanon campaign of 2006 and ignoring hawkish elements within the Israeli defense establishment, Prime Minister Olmert is more likely to give Hamas a few weeks to see whether the military wing of the organization can properly take over security in the Gaza Strip, by controlling the factions, smuggling routes and the border and key crossing points. Observers expect that if this is achieved and power is handed over to the political wing of Hamas, pragmatists in Gaza will seek to re-establish contacts with President 'Abbas and open negotiations for a new unity government.
For the broader Arab world, the perceived failure of Western governments to support Saudi Arabias efforts to heal Palestinian rifts through Februarys national unity agreement in Mecca have paradoxically led Riyadh and other Arab capitals to coalesce behind the US/Europe position, deepening Hamas isolation for now. MEES understands there is frustration in Riyadh that Western governments did not support the Mecca agreement and recognize the unity government, on the basis that even limited financial aid flows could have cemented the multi-party administration and provided some platform for broader political advances. Whatever Israels public pronouncements, the amount of room to maneuver given to Mr 'Abbas new government will be critical to Palestinian perceptions of its effectiveness. If, as in the past, Israeli actions fall short of public promises, there is genuine concern that moderate Palestinian politics will evaporate and be replaced by the Islamic resistance in the West Bank, as it has been in Gaza.




















