18 August 2007
A year ago this week, the 34-day war between Israel and Hizbullah came to an end, but since then the wider ideological battle between Israel the United States and their friends and Hizbullah, Iran, Syria and their friends has only escalated and expanded. A regional diplomatic balance sheet one year after the war suggests that conditions have deteriorated on all fronts, with the possible exception of a renewed focus on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even there, however, the sincerity and the efficacy of the main players - Israel, the US, the Palestinian Authority headed by President Mahmoud Abbas - are very suspect.
Lebanon has been the main loser from last year's war, despite the sense of achievement among Hizbullah supporters who rightly take pride in the organization's ability to fight Israel for 34 days and force it into a diplomatic draw. Hizbullah is discovering that proving one's prowess in unconventional warfare and armed resistance requires very different skills from proving one's skill and agility in political contests.
Hizbullah now finds itself in a much more difficult position than it did a year ago. Militarily it is more constrained by the presence of Lebanese and international troops in South Lebanon. The international community is maintaining and raising the pressure on the party's military re-supply routes from, presumably, Syria and Iran primarily. Within Lebanon, Hizbullah's bold challenge to the Lebanese government in which it once served has elicited a firm counter- reaction of political resistance, commensurate with Hizbullah's military resistance to Israeli aggression.
More troubling for Hizbullah is the criticism it has elicited among some Lebanese who were once admirers or neutral observers, but who now blame it for triggering the war, paralyzing the government, and weakening the economy. While Hizbullah's own support base remains firm and substantial, its wider popular appeal is more vulnerable to shifts, and its alliance with Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun remains susceptible to changes because of the mercurial Aoun's own erratic public standing.
The Lebanese government for its part is not in much better shape. It battles on four fronts simultaneously: against the Hizbullah-Aounist-led opposition; against Fatah al-Islam militants in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in the North; against a perceived threat from Syria's desire to reassert control in Lebanon; and against the constant threat of economic deterioration due largely to political uncertainty. The government has become identified with the US-led drive in the Middle East against Islamists, Syria, Iran and others who challenge America and Israel, while suffering the continued discomfort, if not humiliation, of seeing Lebanon's armed forces limited in their capabilities, while Israel gets everything it needs to dominate the neighboring Arab states.
Israel drew lessons from the 2006 summer war and adjusted its military capabilities and training accordingly, but politically it remains hampered by two cardinal problems: its government has very low credibility at home, and it remains totally baffled by how to peacefully resolve its core conflict with Palestinian nationalism that has befuddled Israel since its birth in 1948. The three Israeli soldiers who were taken prisoner by Palestinians and Hizbullah in 2006 - the alleged trigger for the war it launched against Lebanon - remain in captivity.
Conditions in Palestine itself also have deteriorated in the past year, with the West Bank and Gaza now effectively ruled by two different Palestinian governments. Both have domestic legitimacy, though Israel, the US, Europe and other key players only deal with Abbas in his West Bank enclave, while boycotting Hamas in Gaza.
Wider afield, the situation in Iraq continues to plague everyone, the US maintains pressure on Iran and Syria without any appreciable signs of change in Iranian-Syrian policies, and Saudi Arabia seems to have toned down its diplomatic dynamism of the past year. The threat of terrorism continues to spread throughout the region, especially in the form of small, home-grown groups with strong regional links. Typical are the ones that have reared their head in Lebanon recently, notably Fatah al-Islam, Jund al-Sham and Esbat al-Ansar. The continued expansion and popularity of fundamentalist Sunni Islamist groups, both militant jihadists as well as non-violent salafists, is the most dramatic and troubling ongoing development throughout the region.
It is intriguing that the Bush administration recently recommitted the US - rhetorically at least - to working actively for a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace agreement via a regional conference in autumn. There is no sign that the US will mediate this issue in a balanced and just manner, pull back from its strong pro-Israel bias, or engage the democratically elected Hamas leadership. Nevertheless, the revived American peace-making rhetoric is fascinating, if it reflects sincere acknowledgment that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict justly is the most important single step that can be taken toward addressing the many other conflicts that plague the modern Middle East. That includes last summer's wasteful Lebanon war and the many new problems, deadlocks and tensions it has spawned.
Rami G. Khouri is published twice-weekly by THE DAILY STAR.




















