Ongoing Middle East Crises Could Exacerbate Sunni-Shi΄a Tensions In 2007
The increasingly sectarian nature of the violence in Iraq was starkly highlighted by the circumstances surrounding the execution of former President Saddam Husain and the subsequent reaction in the Arab and Islamic world. However, as Gerald Butt reports, resolving the major crises across the region in the months ahead will be the best way of stopping new eruptions of the centuries-long hostility underlying Sunni-Shi’a relations.
When it seemed that things could get no worse in Iraq, they did. The hope of the Maliki government and its US backers was that the swift execution of Saddam Husain would close a bloody chapter in Iraq’s history. But for a combination of reasons that may never be fully known, the whole affair was bungled. The results: firstly, the unbelievable sight of the late president, long condemned inside and outside the region as a barbaric dictator, being hailed as a hero and martyr by demonstrators in capitals across the Arab world; and secondly, the strong conviction that has taken hold in the Arab Sunni community that the timing (at the start of the sacred Islamic feast of ΄Id al-Adha) and circumstances (hooded Shi΄a militiamen taunting Saddam on the gallows) were part of a plot (Iraqi Shi΄a government/US) to target Sunni Islam as a whole.
Such is the perception – right or wrong. But if perceptions are accepted as reality, then they have to be dealt with as such. And there have been plenty of signs that Sunnis are convinced of the existence of a Shi΄a/US conspiracy. Taking their cue, perhaps, from the last words of Saddam, captured on the illicit mobile-phone recording of the execution, in which he condemned “traitors, Americans, the spies and the Persians,” pro-Saddam demonstrators have vented their anger on Iran as much as on any other target. “Long live Saddam; revenge, revenge, death to America and Iran,” chanted demonstrators in the Jordanian capital, ΄Amman. Similar slogans were heard on the streets of Cairo, San΄a, Tripoli and other Arab capitals.
Media Comments
The anti-Sunni theme was detected by media commentators. Saudi Mushari al-Zaydi, writing in the pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, predicted that the execution of Saddam would “fuel the sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi΄a… Another thing that is certain is that the state of confrontation between Iranian ambitions and the Saudi-led Arab camp is evident… It is only natural that one feels concerned over the growing sectarianism and danger of Iranian expansion. What raises even more concern is that sectarianism will grow in defiance of us, and many will fall prey to this tremendous fermentation.”
The concerns felt by Arab regimes at the apparent rise of Iranian influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East were taken up by Dawud Shirian, a columnist in the other major pan-Arab daily, al-Hayat. In his view, the “hideous execution” of Saddam left Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan in a difficult position – all three states had strongly supported the reconciliation process. But they were disconcerted to find that “the execution of Saddam Husain in this provocative way was a representation of Tehran’s determination to continue implementing its plans; Tehran described the barbaric execution as ‘divine justice’.”
Long-Standing Concerns
While the latest developments in Iraq have increased concerns across the Arab world about the spread of Sunni-Shi΄a tension, these worries have been building up for some time. In recent parliamentary elections in both Kuwait and Bahrain – with the Shi΄a the numerically dominant community in the latter – tensions between adherents of the two main sects of Islam surfaced, despite efforts by the authorities to minimize their impact. Kuwaiti and Bahraini leaders have since made urgent appeals for sectarian division to be put aside in the cause of their nations’ interests. In Saudi Arabia, too, there have long been anxieties that the predominant Shi΄a community in the Eastern Province might be emboldened by the flexing of muscles in Tehran to demand greater rights within the kingdom.
But the most dramatic outpouring of Shi΄a self-confidence has been in Lebanon – in particular in the months since last summer when Hizbollah, the organization backed both by Iran and Syria, carried out a successful military campaign against Israeli forces in the south of the country. Hizbollah, with strong support from its regional allies, remains determined to convert its military achievement into a substantial political prize – at the same time ousting the current Western-oriented government in Beirut. The Lebanese authorities, backed by the West, reject Hizbollah’s demands on a matter of constitutional principle – but also because they fear that to back down would further extend Iran’s reach into Lebanon.
Shi΄a Crescent
The concept of Iran exploiting support among the disparate Shi΄a populations in the Arab world was first articulated on a public platform by King ΄Abd Allah of Jordan in December 2004. In remarks that were regarded by many observers at the time as being exaggerated and provocative he told a US newspaper that the establishment of a government comprised of pro-Iranian politicians in Iraq could create a new “crescent” of dominant Shi΄a movements or governments stretching from Iran, into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, altering the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and posing new challenges to American interests and to its allies. He added that a new Shi΄a crescent would particularly destabilize Gulf countries with Shi΄a populations: “Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this. It would be a major problem.”
In a subsequent interview, King ΄Abd Allah explained that his concern was “political, not religious, revolving around Iran, Iran’s political involvement inside Iraq, its relation with Syria and Hizbollah, and the strengthening of this political-strategic alliance.” Speaking last year, President Husni Mubarak of Egypt was less circumspect. Referring to Iraq’s neighbors, he said “there are Shi΄a in all these countries in significant percentages, and Shi΄a are almost always loyal to Iran and not to the countries where they live” (MEES, 17 April 2006).
Putting It Into Context
Having portrayed fears of Sunni-Shi΄a tension in their most explicit form, it is important to put the latest developments in context. For example, every Iraqi and Lebanese national that I know insists emphatically that Sunni-Shi΄a hostility is not an inherent part of the fabric of either country – rather, it is being exploited for political purposes. In other words it is highly unlikely that tension would erupt between individual Sunnis and Shi΄a at the workplace in the Gulf, Jordan or anywhere else. It is equally unlikely that similar tension would scupper a major commercial deal between, say, Kuwait and Iran. So, for instance, while Kuwait’s hope to secure natural gas imports from Iran might be delayed because of general tension in the region – perhaps, over the nuclear issue – it seems improbable that Sunni-Shi΄a differences alone would cause talks to be postponed. Similarly, Arab Gulf states’ concerns about Tehran’s regional ambitions will not stop ministers and officials meeting their Iranian opposite numbers at OPEC and other forums.
The broader context takes one back to the seventh century, and the split in Islam that led to civil war within the young Islamic community in the decades shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Arab history has been punctuated by eruptions of Sunni-Shi΄a hostilities after long periods of harmony. The resurfacing of tension today is probably an indicator of widespread regional instability that is easy to exploit – just as the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict is a constant source of inspiration for anti-Western Islamic militants. While Iraq remains in turmoil and until Baghdad establishes a solid post-Saddam relationship both with Iran and the Arab Gulf states, the region will remain unstable. Similarly, the Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt will be uneasy until they see the extent of Iran’s political ambitions. And at times of uncertainty the natural tendency is to stick sectarian labels on those you distrust. The only sure way of removing the labels is to find lasting political solutions to the string of crises causing the current instability across the region.
