Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, two things are certain. One is that neither he (assuming he is still alive) nor his regime will be making a comeback. The other is that no new regime can take shape without a substantial Shia component, with all the repercussions that would have on Iraq's Arab and non-Arab neighbours.
Iraq's future will be decisively shaped by the Shia - who constitute a majority of the Arab population - and by the outcome of their internecine struggles. These involve a variety of issues, such as attitudes to Iran and the scope of its influence and the question of restoring Najaf's spiritual authority over Qom, the Iranian city that became the main centre for training Shia clerics after Mr Hussein suppressed Najaf's seminaries. Another important area of dispute is the doctrine of velayat-e-faqih, which, it is argued, bestows supreme political authority on Iran's spiritual leader.
The first outward sign of how potentially bloody these struggles could be was the assassination of Abdul Majid al-Khoei - grandson of the late Grand Ayatollah Abulqassem al-Khoei - in Najaf shortly after it was captured by American and British forces. This was to prevent the emergence in Iraq of a moderate pro-western Shia cleric who was both close to the US and Britain and had deep Arab, specifically Hashemite, roots. On returning to Najaf from exile in London, Mr Khoei had sought to calm the situation there by announcing that he had secured a fatwa from the most senior traditional clerical authority, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, essentially instructing people not to oppose the Americans and British. The haste with which Mr Khoei made his way to Najaf when the situation was still precarious, and his brutal murder by a local militia, exemplify the gravity of the inter-Shia struggle.
The rash behaviour that was Mr Khoei's undoing stands in contrast to the carefully considered approach of the Iranians' point man, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri). He waited a month after the fall of the Ba'athists before returning to Iraq under heavy guard; and sent his brother Abdul Aziz al-Hakim ahead of him to drum up support. Sciri activists were also smuggled into the country with the help of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Sciri has done many things to strengthen its hand. These include opening a dialogue with the US, which became public at the Iraqi opposition conference held in London in mid- December. The Americans could not have convened the conference (which issued a statement recognising the Shia majority in Iraq) without Sciri's participation, which in turn required Iran's blessing.
Sciri is well placed to benefit from the political vacuum in Iraq. While the US has been working towards an interim authority, Mr Hakim has been organising his followers with one clear objective in mind: to affirm that he is the principal representative of the Shia. At the same time, he has been deploying fighters from Sciri's military wing, the Badr Brigade, albeit in civilian clothes, and delivering a moderate political message aimed at reassuring the US that his goal is not to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic.
So far, there appears to be no alternative to dealing with Sciri, in its capacity as the most powerful Shia party. The US will have to co-opt it into the interim authority, even at the expense of liberal Shia who have always perceived themselves as Arabs first and foremost and who opposed Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran just as they opposed Mr Hussein's regime.
Are these liberal Shia, who believe the clergy should be shut out from administering the affairs of state, set to become the most prominent losers in post-Hussein Iraq? The question is valid in the absence of a clear US plan for Iraq. What the country needs is a strong central authority whose composition reflects the country's diverse ethnic and religious groups. Without such inclusiveness, it will lack moral authority among Iraqis, however strong its security apparatus.
In short, Iraq does not need another Khomeini but a "council of the wise" that can restore to it a measure of the democracy, tolerance and stability enjoyed under Hashemite rule - the only golden age Iraq has known since becoming an independent state. Failing that, the country would seem to be heading for a dictatorship of a religious character, not unlike Mr Hussein's chauvinistic nationalist regime.
The writer is a London-based Lebanese political analyst
By Khairalla Khairalla
