How Iraq can turn Saddam's capture to advantage

Tuesday, Dec 16, 2003

With the capture of Saddam Hussein last Saturday, at least two crucial elements of the ex- president's cult were overturned: his image overseas as the anti-imperialist Arab warrior; and his image at home as an invincible, omnipotent survivor. The end of the Saddam myth will be decisive in Iraq's political future.

For the past eight months, Mr Hussein's elusive presence has been a perilous element of uncertainty for the great majority of Iraqis. Fear of his mere existence, not to mention his possible return to power, was exacerbated by the constant attacks against coalition forces. Reorganised Ba'athist groups grew bolder and began armed patrols in some neighbourhoods, threatening anyone who co-operated with the coalition forces and, in recent weeks, extorting contributions to the "resistance". Old stories of Mr Hussein's piercing eyes, able to read the thoughts of his interlocutors, and his preternatural ability to avert harm began to resurface. So too did conspiratorial fantasies that he was secretly working with the Americans to serve a common end.

The television footage of Mr Hussein after his capture - a broken man, submissive in the hands of his American doctor - has put paid to such myths for once and for all. Still more damaging to him was his instant surrender, which contrasted sharply with the fight put up by his sons Uday and Qusay and his teenage grandson in Mosul in July.

In some ways, the transition to a post-Saddam Iraq is more significant than the transition to a post-conflict Iraq. Mr Hussein's capture marks a dramatic change in the fortunes of the noisy loyalist camp and their fundamentalist allies. Most people in Baghdad greeted the news with jubilation, but largely in private; for decades, public opinion in Iraq has been manifested in what people confide in private rather than what they state in public and old habits die hard.

Among the loyalists the shock will become apparent in the weeks to come, as the networks organised before, during and after invasion become increasingly demoralised. Their claim to fight not for Mr Hussein but for lofty, patriotic ends is empty rhetoric. This is because Mr Hussein's power structures were highly personalised. The livelihood, prestige and status of his proteges in business, the army and local politics depended solely on him and his hand-outs. His inner circle was bonded by blood ties, economic interest and common guilt. Now these bonds have fractured, as shown by the fact that the information on his whereabouts came from within the inner circle.

With the loss of their guiding light, leaders of local networks will be strongly inclined to turn the financial and material assets at their disposal to their own personal ends, rather than to risk all in a futile struggle. This would therefore be a good moment to rethink the process of de-Ba'athification, whose methods have been deeply flawed. So far it has been overly dogmatic, penalising all who benefited from the old order. A more pragmatic approach is needed to neutralise Mr Hussein's loyalists, both the hundreds of thousands who are broadly supportive and the thousands who are actively involved in operations against the coalition.

Thus far the loyalists have been the heart of the insurgency; but the demoralisation and disintegration of this camp could result in leadership falling into fundamentalist hands. The best way to forestall this would be to offer an amnesty to loyalists. This gesture would have to be matched with opportunities for employment and other forms of participation in rebuilding Iraq.

The silent majority that, despite being tainted by association with the old regime, is not actively involved with the insurgency in the Sunni areas will be gradually emboldened to come out into the open as violence recedes. New flurries of attacks may still occur but they will be short-lived.

Iraq's Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority should seize this moment to connect the various elements of this group in a meaningful, inclusive spirit. Besides tribal chieftains - mistakenly thought to be the main force in society - professional people, bureaucrats, clerics and, most importantly, businessmen form the pillars of social authority. Realism - not ideological, self-righteous liberalism - should prevail to enable Iraq to overcome the effects of three decades of conflict.

The writer is senior fellow at the Institute of Peace, Washington, and author of The Shiite Movement in Iraq (Saqi Books, London, 2003)

Faleh Jabar