29 June 2007

Driven by a common fear of Islamic fundamentalism and by a false assumption that the latter is an illegitimate political force, the Middle East's so-called "moderates" once again gathered this week at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh - the traditional venue for emergency regional summits, to rally "moderates" against "extremists."

In spring 1996, the "moderates" - Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, Yasser Arafat, and even some representatives of the Gulf dynasties - convened in Sharm el-Sheikh with US President Bill Clinton and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in a desperate bid to block radical Islam's emergence. They were also expected to give an electoral boost to Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel who, severely undermined by Hamas' devastating campaign of suicide terrorism, was on the verge of electoral defeat at the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu.

But Islamic fundamentalism remained unimpressed. Both its jihadist and political identity have, indeed, only gained momentum ever since.

In October 2000, Sharm el-Sheikh was the scene of another summit, with most of the same actors. This time, the call went out for an end to the Palestinian Intifada and for Israelis and Palestinians to reach a final peace agreement. Both objectives were endorsed by all the participants; neither was implemented.

As one of the players at that summit, I understand the reason for the gap between what was agreed by the "moderates" and the harsh realities that have driven the "extremists" forward. The only way Arafat could stop the intifada and stem the advance of Hamas was through an especially generous peace deal from Israel. But such a deal became impossible precisely because the intifada had raised Palestinian expectations to such heights that it became impossible for Israel to meet them.

Notwithstanding Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's commendable gestures at Sharm el-Sheikh earlier this week, the summit's achievements are bound to be short-lived. It is hard to believe that transferring to the Palestinians tax revenues owed to them, removing a limited number of checkpoints in the occupied West Bank, and even releasing 250 Fatah prisoners "with no blood on their hands" will calm the Palestinian volcano and enhance Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' leadership and Fatah's edge over Hamas. Indeed, all indications are that Hamas might soon boost its popularity by exchanging Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit for even more prisoners, including some "with blood on their hands."

This alliance of Middle East moderates comes with a price that neither Israel nor the Bush administration seems ready to pay. The Israeli-American strategy of driving a wedge between Gaza and the West Bank while shunning negotiations on a peace settlement that could give Abbas the ultimate tool to undermine Hamas is a policy at war with itself.

Moreover, no matter how critical the moderate Arabs may be of the Hamas coup in Gaza, the Arab leaders cannot afford the domestic fallout of shunning Hamas. Indeed, Mubarak has already called for a resumption of inter-Palestinian dialogue, which might lead to yet another attempt at a national unity government, the same kind of government with which both Israel and the US refused to do business.

Abbas is being asked to play for high stakes - defeating Hamas and with it the cause of Islamic fundamentalism in the region - with inadequate resources. And, by mortgaging his entire Middle East policy to the concept of an "ideological confrontation" against the forces of evil, Bush is putting his strategy on the weary shoulders of a defeated Palestinian president without really providing him with the necessary tools.

Worse still, by ladling money and arms to Abbas without offering him a political horizon that would deepen his support among ordinary Palestinians, while at the same time imprisoning all Hamas leaders in the West Bank, Israel and the US are condemning Abbas to seeming a collaborator in the eyes of his people.

Of course the Arabs are not free of blame either. No Israeli government will risk making a far-reaching peace offer to a Palestinian Authority whose rule is characterized by abdication and anarchy. Hamas' emergence as a formidable military force also reflects the Egyptians' inept performance in preventing the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. Taming Hamas is in Egypt's interest, but it refuses to pay the price of a direct confrontation because that might lead to a perception that Egyptian forces are Israel's protectors.

Indeed, Mubarak's strategic vision is desperately narrow. His role as a broker of sorts is mostly aimed at endearing himself to the US, where Congress is highly critical of his human rights record. On his home front, he needs to cultivate, at the lowest possible price, an image as a champion of the Palestinian cause. The latest Sharm el-Sheikh summit is also a message to the Saudis: Cairo, not Mecca, is the center of Middle East politics.

Calling for Israeli concessions is perfectly legitimate, even necessary. But the credibility of such demands is undermined by the Arabs' inability to alleviate Palestinian misery and, no less importantly, by their failure to help the Palestinians face the hard choices they will need to make if an orderly Palestinian state is ever to emerge.

Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, now serves as vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace. His latest book is "Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy." THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project Syndicate (c) (www.project-syndicate.org).