30 March 2010

One year ago, my first effort after leaving the US Defense Department was to publish a piece in a major Israeli newspaper explaining why Israel should support a strong Lebanese military. As one of the architects of the United States’ program to re-build the Lebanese Armed Forces, a concept Israel has resisted, I thought it vital that the Israeli public understand how important this effort was for regional security.

I now realize that I was wrong, not in terms of substance, but in my audience. Instead, I should have written a piece for the Lebanese media explaining why Lebanon should support the effort.

After a host of meetings I held in Beirut this month, it is painfully clear to me that the American program to train and equip Lebanon’s armed forces is misunderstood. Its purpose, substance, and pace were criticized by nearly every political or military leader with whom I met while on my trip.

“Lebanon has not received anything from the United States,” argued one individual. Because of this lack of support, explained another, the Lebanese Army “fights with its bodies.” Overall, the criticism could be summarized in three words: more, better, faster. However, this reaction demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of how and why Washington has provided Lebanon with half a billion dollars in military aid since 2006.

After the withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005, the United States began assessing how to rapidly build Lebanon’s armed forces in an effort to allow the Lebanese government to impose its sovereignty nationwide. This is essentially a domestic defense mission to allow the authorities in Beirut to establish security – and therefore stability – throughout Lebanese territory. Further, such an effort would help diminish the ability of external actors to interfere in domestic Lebanese affairs, making it possible for Lebanon to focus on containing the destabilizing impact of domestic armed groups.

From the start, the United States strived to build Lebanon’s armed forces in a prudent and appropriate manner by providing it with the capabilities it required. When the program first began, a thorough assessment of the army’s needs demonstrated that the two most important priorities were mobility and ammunition. A military unable to maneuver throughout its territory and equipped with three-five bullets per soldier (each year) can play, at best, a negligible national role. In sending Lebanon hundreds of vehicles, spare parts, and millions of rounds of ammunition – followed later on by more sophisticated equipment – Washington gave Lebanon what its military required.

This may not have been the sexiest sort of military equipment, but until the Lebanese Armed Forces attain a base level of capability, it would be, simply, shortsighted to provide them with materiel they are incapable of using.

The criticism that the American security assistance program is painfully slow and outdated is well-understood throughout Washington. To alleviate this shortcoming, however, creative authorities have been employed to allow the United States to deliver training and equipment to key allies more rapidly.

Lebanon has benefitted significantly from these programs, which have enabled hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to reach Lebanon since 2006. It is important to add that at a critical moment such as when the Lebanese Army battled Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Bared in 2007, the US surged its assistance to the armed forces, racing more than 40 airplanes full of equipment to Beirut.

While US aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces should have begun sooner than it did (the first tranche did not arrive until the middle of 2006), the pace of delivery since that time has been as rapid as possible, given important competing requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are, however, important responsibilities incumbent on Lebanon as well. Almost half a decade has passed since the Syrian military presence in Lebanon came to an end, and yet Lebanese investment in the armed forces has stagnated. More importantly, it is time for the authorities to provide a real vision for the military and better define its mission, not simply prepare wish lists of goods that they would like to see delivered. 

Of course, the effectiveness of the army reflects political will in Lebanon, and the current national dialogue has demonstrated little desire on the part of the Lebanese to outline a sensible defense strategy. But if the United States is investing substantial time, energy, and effort into supporting Lebanon’s armed forces, it is surely entitled to expect that Lebanon do the same.


Mara E. Karlin served as the Pentagon’s

Levant director and special assistant to the under secretary of defense for policy. She is an instructor and a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced

International Studies in Washington DC. She wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

Copyright The Daily Star 2010.