Wednesday, Nov 20, 2013
Seventy years after gaining juridical independence from France, then a Mandate power that governed a large sway of Syrian territories, Lebanese citizens struggled with the very notion. Based on a 1943 ‘National Charter’ that united its Christian and Muslim populations, Beirut lived through periodic skirmishes (1952, 1958, 1973), endured the repercussions of a significant Palestinian refugee population (1948, 1967, 1973), a bloody civil war (1975-1990), countless Israeli attacks and repeated invasions (1978, 1982-2000, 2006), only to face the conundrum of disunity under a single constitution, notwithstanding frequent pledges to uphold what was agreed upon at various times (1921, 1943, 1989). What seldom changed during the past seven decades were sharp interpretations of the nation’s identity.
In the aftermath of the post-2010 Arab uprisings, which may be traced to the massive March 2005 demonstrations that ended 30 years of Syrian occupation, the Lebanese once again confronted an existential moment. While Hezbollah earned genuine respect and support when it stood against Israeli occupation and literally forced the latter to withdraw from most of the country in 2000, the party’s unilateral involvement in Syria backfired as early as Spring 2011, which further divided the nation. Against the will of the Lebanese Government that, ironically, included it, Hezbollah disregarded the June 2012 Baabda Declaration issued unanimously by the National Committee of Dialogue.
In three specific clauses, the statement upheld the 1989 Ta’if Accords (Paragraph 11), called on everyone to “eschew block politics and regional and international conflicts” (Paragraph 12) and, most important, approved the basic idea that the country “cannot be used as a base, corridor or starting point to smuggle weapons and combatants” (Paragraph 13). That was an invitation for Hezbollah to withdraw its guerrillas from the battlefield and rejoin the political family that pretended to govern this country. In the event, party officials rejected the declaration, shortly after they gingerly affixed their imprimaturs.
It was within this context that President Michel Sulaiman spoke to a new gathering last Saturday, the Muntada Baabda, as he stressed that the time was right for everyone to return to their commitments, reiterating once again that only such a step would safeguard Lebanon from regional unrest and preserve its unity. Though he was not scheduled to speak at the gathering, a dejected Sulaiman went to the podium, and in front of a selected gathering that included the caretaker Prime Minister, Najeeb Miqati, emphasised: “The essence of the Declaration should be incorporated in Lebanon’s constitution.”
Of course, the staged gesture was an incredibly astute step, with Sulaiman hammering that the declaration did “not call for Lebanon to become neutral from Syria because such a demand required certain measures and an agreement of its own,” though he underscored the need to respect the Ta’if Accords, because neither it nor the 2012 Declaration were temporary in nature. The head of state was polite when he stated “whoever is disregarding the Declaration now will come to realise its importance in the future,” sending a clear message to Hezbollah. What Sulaiman affirmed was simple: Lebanon’s fate should not be tied to regional developments and local actors must guarantee its neutrality, if the country was to remain independent.
In the event, the president will now live the most difficult six months of his life as political forces attempt to rewrite the rules of the game. Observers of the country posit that Hezbollah preferred to reach a vacancy — which it would presumably fill — since it rejected an extension of Sulaiman’s term of office. Naturally, a lot depended on what occurred in Syria, the ongoing negotiations between the P5+1 group (US, Britain, France, Russia, China + Germany) and Iran over Tehran’s nuclear programme and, equally important, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as all had an impact on Lebanon. Everyone was concerned that a presidential void would threaten existing institutions, though local actors competed to see which one could utter more outrageous claims to help preserve them.
Nabih Berri, the Speaker of Lebanon’s moribund parliament that was nothing short of a unique paragon of inaction, chimed one of his more colourful declarations when he acknowledged that the Lebanese ruling system had become “a creator of strife”. Modesty prevented him from taking credit for adding fuel to the fire. Likewise, Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun, launched one of his more vociferous attacks against the 1989 Ta’if Accords, describing them as agreements “of fraud to consolidate foreign grip over Lebanon”. Others were less concerned with etiquette and threatened to cut the hands of those who dared question their rights to do as they pleased. Still others continued to live the dolce vitta (a luxurious, self-indulgent way of life), oblivious to what went on all around them. There were even open discussions of taboo subjects, including the need for Muslim-Christian coexistence or doubting the very power-sharing formula that allowed Lebanon to be viewed as an independent country.
Against this plethora of rapidly changing views, every actor believed that he was entitled to interpret the nation’s identity at will, unaware that constitutional changes could only be ushered through legal processes. Even the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Bisharah al-Ra’i, jumped into the fray since he believed that Beirut needed “a new social contract,” oblivious to the notion that such a pact guaranteed the end of Lebanon as presently constituted (post-Ta’if) and in which a political parity existed between Muslims and Christians.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is an author, most recently of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (Routledge, 2013).
By Joseph A. Kechichian | Senior Writer
Gulf News 2013. All rights reserved.
