The wolf, the goat, and Iran's revived nuclear program

20 January 2006

To help explain the Middle East, a senior leader of an organization that the United States government describes as "terrorist" recently told me a parable. "There were once a wolf and a goat," he said. "The wolf was guarding a spring and the goat was drinking from the pond below. The wolf growled at the goat: 'I'm going to kill you because you're drinking my water.' The goat shook his head: 'you're not going to kill me because I'm drinking your water,' he bleated. 'You're going to kill me because you're the wolf - and I'm the goat.'"

The parable seems particularly pertinent now, as rumors are once again circulating that the U.S. is considering a military strike that would destroy Iran's nuclear capacity. The reports have been sparked by Iran's announcement that it will resume nuclear research that includes uranium enrichment, a step essential to the building of a nuclear weapon. Even defenders of Iran view this announcement with trepidation, as nuclear weapons are "inherently destabilizing" - that is to say, really dangerous.

Oddly, the U.S. seems less concerned with nuclear weapons and more concerned with Iran. U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns made this clear in a speech last November 30. Iran should be barred from enriching uranium, Burns said, because it supports international terrorism (they "fund" Hizbullah which "represents a threat to Lebanon's fragile peace" - the views of Lebanon's voters notwithstanding); because Iran is "undermining Iraqi sovereignty" (breathtaking, really, when you think about it); because Iran has an "abysmal" human rights record (as opposed to China); and because Iran is not a democracy (like, say, Pakistan).

Nowhere did Burns mention that the U.S. government considers the development of nuclear weapons bad in itself because the consequences of their use are too horrible to consider. Rather, Burns seemed to be saying that if Iran ceased funding Hizbullah, stopped interfering in Iraq, opened its jails and became more democratic, then it could have its nuclear weapons. In truth, this is much less ludicrous than it seems.

 There's even a precedent for it: India has nuclear weapons, and Washington thinks that's just fine. Despite the fact that India never signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which Iran has signed), the U.S. lifted sanctions against India when the Indian government signed on to the war on terrorism. The message was clear: the U.S. will reward a country that breaks the rules, so long as it is an American ally.

One year ago, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced the creation of a U.S.-India "strategic partnership." The partnership includes joint development of commercial satellites, the transfer of previously barred U.S. technology, expanded trade and deeper military cooperation. This development was no surprise: it followed Israel's September 2001 opening to the Indian government, the creation of a U.S.-India Institute for Strategic Policy, State Department approval of Israeli-Indian cooperation, and U.S. approval of Israel's sale of three Phalcon airborne early-warning systems to New Delhi.

Washington's other ally, Pakistan, which also has nuclear weapons, was initially outraged by the U.S.-India partnership and called the transfer of Phalcon technology "a matter of serious concern." But Pakistani criticism was first heard in September 2003, when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made a highly publicized visit to New Delhi. The Sharon visit led Pakistani officials to quietly suggest that President Pervez Musharraf follow suit by building his own relationship with Israel. When Musharraf visited Washington, Bush reportedly urged him to consider improving relations with Israel. The Pakistani president proved he knows how to take a hint and rushed to tell reporters at Camp David that opening relations with Israel was not out of the question. Inevitably, Musharraf's statement was followed by a meeting of Pakistan's and Israel's foreign ministers in Istanbul on September 1, 2005.

The Iranian leadership might be condemned for viewing these series of events with deep cynicism. That the U.S. would urge its allies to recognize Israel should not come as a surprise. But regardless of their cynicism, Iranians know how to read newspapers - including Pakistani newspapers. These were the same newspapers that urged Musharraf to build a "new relationship" between Pakistan and Israel. The reason? Because "recognition of Israel would reduce the risk of an Israeli strike against Pakistan's nuclear resources." We might hesitate to draw our own conclusions from such statements, discomfiting as they are: U.S. policy toward Iran has a lot less to do with democracy or terrorism or Hizbullah or human rights - or nuclear weapons, for that matter - than it does with serving the needs of Israel. 

That conclusion may well be false; it may be that the U.S. is acting in good faith. It may be that recognition of Israel is not a condition for being a nuclear power. It may be that the U.S. government is actually working to stop the spread of nuclear weapons because they're bad weapons. But, if so, the administration must say that and say it now. It must make clear that it is angry with Iran for good reason; not because Iran is the goat, but because it's drinking from the pool.

Mark Perry is vice president of Jefferson Waterman International, a Washington consulting firm. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.