27 December 2005

At first glance, it would appear the Palestinian Football Association (FA) was being inexplicably fastidious. After a recent "peace match" between a joint Israeli-Palestinian football team and European giants Barcelona, the Palestinian FA threatened sanctions against its members from the Occupied Territories who took part, saying the match was an example of the proscribed "normalization" of ties with Israel. Understanding such nitpicking by those who oppose normalization is easier, however, when one considers just how much on the defensive they've been of late. Ever since its August withdrawal from Gaza, Israel has made significant gains in its longstanding plan to establish diplomatic and economic ties with Arab and Muslim states prior to a final peace settlement.

Few analysts believe that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw from strategically marginal Gaza signals a genuine willingness to make the concessions necessary for a just peace. Nevertheless, the withdrawal generated a diplomatic windfall for Israel, leading to praise it parlayed into photo-ops and economic agreements with traditional foes such as Pakistan, Libya, Indonesia and Bahrain. And if, as has been reported, Saudi Arabia, in order to join the WTO, has officially ended its participation in the Arab boycott to isolate Israel until it withdraws fully from all occupied Arab lands, it would represent a huge strategic shift. "I've had to pinch myself over these latest developments," a rightfully pleased Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom told USA Today.

The last time Israel had this successful a diplomatic run was after Oslo, and it used its buffered strategic position then to buy time and consolidate control over the Occupied Territories. Opponents of normalization justifiably argue the same outcome is likely this time around.

Many purported Palestinian allies have used the unwarranted optimism generated by the Gaza withdrawal as an excuse to engage Israel. They are doing so not only because of heavy diplomatic pressure and economic incentives from Washington (being nice to Israel is also one way states like Jordan and Egypt can deflect American pressure to democratize), but also to seize the undeniable strategic advantages that come with befriending the Middle East's economic and military superpower.

Courting Israel has become all the rage: Shalom, standing in for Sharon, was warmly welcomed at a recent United Nations technology summit in Tunisia; Pakistan, formerly a standard bearer for the Palestinian cause but now desperate to offset the budding India-Israel alliance, has flaunted its high-level talks with Israel; even Libyan officials have privately met their Israeli counterparts, to bolster U.S. support for Libya's reintegration into the international community; and the foreign ministers of Israel and Indonesia met at the UN World Summit in New York in September, and the two states are also reportedly negotiating a trade agreement.

But it is Gulf Arab states, spying gold at the end of the normalization rainbow, that have been most forthright. The government of Bahrain has signed a free-trade agreement with the U.S. that contains a provision requiring it to drop its economic boycott of Israel, a condition Washington is imposing on all similar pacts with other Arab states. Oman may soon sign a similar agreement. Qatar continues to maintain a trade office in Tel Aviv, and, according to a report in the Israeli press, Israel has opened a secret diplomatic trade mission in Dubai. If Saudi Arabia ends its embargo, this would effectively kill the Arab boycott.

The short-term, hardheaded benefits of engaging Israel are obvious. But doing so while Israel continues to oppress the Palestinians is not only immoral, but also potentially dangerous to the long-term national interest of those countries involved. Normalization is being pushed by unelected elites under conspicuous U.S. pressure. It will not only increase public cynicism about the West's claims to support "democratization," it will also stir popular discontent among staunchly pro-Palestinian publics. The decision to invite Sharon to Tunis was met with protests, while unrest also erupted in Bahrain, forcing Parliament to pass an act reinstating the boycott (although the king will likely have the last word on that).

The two main pro-normalization arguments were recently expressed by Kuwaiti commentator Ahmad al-Sarraf. First, he made the "We can only help the Palestinians by talking to Israel" argument: "How can you exert any pressure on someone by not recognizing them?" he asked in an interview with The New York Times. If Kuwait sold Israel oil, it would help them bargain on behalf of the Palestinians, said Sarraf. The problem with this argument is that influential Arab and Muslim states like Egypt or Turkey already recognize Israel and have been talking to it for years. They have not succeeded in moderating Israeli policies one iota, and it is therefore unlikely that Kuwait or Bahrain will.

Next, Sarraf made the "We can't be more Palestinian than the Palestinians" argument. The Palestinians talk to Israel, he said, so there is no reason Kuwait should not. This argument is self-serving. The Palestinians only recognized Israel grudgingly and negotiated with it because they had no other choice. All they ask of their supporters is a little forbearance. Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf, for one, insisted he had Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' support. However, then-PA Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath expressed a more widely-held Palestinian desire that Pakistan wait until Israel made real compromises: "The time for [normalization] will come when Israel withdraws from the West Bank as part of the Arab peace program," he said.

The normalization racket is a bait and switch the Arab and Muslim publics have seen before. Their cynicism about Israeli and American motives and the prospects for peace is the context in which the Palestinian FA's gesture should be understood. It would have been de rigueur even if the Peres Center All Stars had not lost to Ronaldhino's Barca, 2-1. Until there are substantive negotiations for an equitable peace, normalization may be imposed from above but it will not be embraced from below.

Ashraf Fahim is a freelance writer on Middle Eastern affairs based in New York City. His writings can be found at www.storminateacup.org.uk. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.