26 February 2005
A quarter of a century before the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and the war in Iraq, Lebanon's collapse into conflict stirred up a host of issues and challenges that were echoed throughout the Middle East in subsequent years. The recent assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri happened to revive some of these very issues. One could argue that the roots of the calamity which befell New York and Washington in 2001 stretched back to the conflict that started in 1975 in the little Mediterranean country. Nor can the Lebanese experience be ignored at a time when many are calling for the prewar Lebanese political model to be applied to post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
Apart from certain minor tensions, Lebanon was in many respects the most advanced country in the Middle East from the time of its foundation in 1920 until the outbreak of its civil war. It had emerged from an idea of "freedom," meaning liberty for religious minorities, not as a response to the notion of "national unity," as was the case in Syria, for example.
At the same time, the Lebanese state was established on the basis of a compact between the different religious sects, each of which was granted its own slice of the national cake. This pragmatic approach (which had its origins in trade) ran counter to the more ideological aspect of nation-building witnessed in Germany and Italy during the late 19th century. Of course, the Lebanese sects could still fight politically to improve their respective lots, but without going so far as to question the principle of allocating "shares" and power along sectarian lines.
It is true that the Maronite sect, which had created the idea of a distinct Lebanese identity, enjoyed certain guarantees and privileges; but this did not mean that political mobility was denied to all other religious groups. Indeed, the situation was far from resembling a closed caste system, let alone the former racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa.
It was not always easy to maintain Lebanon's sectarian balance or sustain the spread of capitalism from Beirut and Mount Lebanon to other regions. However, even the more intractable Maronites tended to give way to their more moderate countrymen whenever they felt that sectarian disputes were a purely Lebanese affair with no foreign interests lurking behind. This happened during the so-called "White Revolution" of 1952, and again in the 1960s when the right-wing Phalange party aligned itself with the reformist agenda of President Fouad Chehab. It was always private enterprise, far removed from government economic policy, that intervened to bring about a greater degree of homogeneity between Lebanon's regions and sects. By the 1970s it had become possible to talk of a "Lebanese way of life," reflecting local cuisine, folklore, dialects and other collective habits.
The principle of sectarian balance not only saved Lebanon from military coups and dictatorship; it also led to the development of a political order which ran counter to the two prevailing systems in the region: hereditary absolute monarchy and military rule. The Lebanese system was based on the support of the largest middle class in the Arab world. It succeeded in producing freedom of the press, a parliament, political parties, and unions - developments which could, in principle, have been taken much further. In a way, the postwar embodiment of such attitudes was Hariri, and his reconstruction program that sought much sustenance in Lebanon's prewar philosophy.
Yet in the long run, perhaps more important than this, was the emergence of a Lebanese version of Islam that was open to others, intellectually influenced by a semi-reformed Christianity, and itself willing to adopt gradual religious reforms. Unlike the violent endeavors of late to "modernize" and "Westernize" Afghanistan and Iraq, Lebanon offered an example of how both processes could be achieved peacefully, with modern political concepts taking hold in society backed by broad popular acceptance.
In managing, by diplomatic means, to stay out of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, Lebanon also provided a highly sensible way of dealing with Israel, in the long-term expectation of a comprehensive peace agreement. On the one hand, Lebanon agreed to an economic boycott of Israel for as long as the Palestinian problem remained unresolved; on the other, the military truce between the two countries prevented a confrontation.
Lebanon in 1975 seemed to have come a long way in occupying a middle ground between modern, democratic capitalism and primordial "oriental" traditions. However, the triumph of the latter was sealed by the advent of the civil war - a result of several factors: In the climate of the cold war, the repercussions of the 1967 and 1973 wars exacerbated Arab-Israeli tensions to an uncontrollable degree. When Egypt later renounced the struggle and Syria finalized its transformation into a police state, the only remaining front in the conflict was Lebanon. In that fevered atmosphere, the Lebanese ruling elite, in which Maronite Christians played a leading, though not exclusive, role, was paralyzed. Internal Lebanese grievances - regional, sectarian, and those derived from capitalism and the migration of industrial labor to the cities - found their unified organizational expression in the semi-leftist, semi-Islamic, semi-nationalist coalition known as the Lebanese National Movement.
The wartime defeat of all that was "modern" and "Westernized" in Lebanon's make-up raised some extremely complex questions that foreshadowed subsequent developments in many other parts of the Middle East. Was national allegiance owed principally to the nation-state (Lebanon in this case), or to sub-national ties (such as religious, sectarian and tribal groupings), all of which found themselves under the ideological umbrella of Arab nationalism and Islam? Was viable patriotism to be positive, taking the interest of the nation as its standard? Or negative, defining itself through resistance to an adversary, be it "American imperialism," Israel, or something else?
Other questions the war raised had to do with the Palestinians. Could the Palestinian problem be addressed by establishing successful and internationally respected democratic Arab models of dealing with minorities, so as to shape Israeli and international public opinion? Or, instead, did it have to be resolved through wars that were disastrous for everyone? Was it permissible to go on indefinitely exploiting Palestinian suffering (as in this case of Palestinians living in Lebanon) in the interests of Syrian and Iranian influence? Or was it possible to deal with the problem in a humanitarian manner, leaving aside inflated ideological demands?
And beyond that, was Islam to be encouraged to adopt religious reforms, leading to a lively non-literal interpretation of the sacred text and a theological understanding of the non-Muslim "other," or was it to remain the prey of firebrands and populists? How could there be a new resurgence in third-world countries given the demographic challenges posed by uncontrolled birth rates and the threat of radical movements and international terrorism?
Sept. 11 revealed the lack of a single enlightened Arab model - one that Lebanon could have provided had it not disintegrated into war. Yet perhaps it's time to reassess Lebanon's legacy, and ask whether the attacks in New York and Washington would have ever happened if the mentality expressed by Lebanese society had had the opportunity to spread in the Middle East. Such a reassessment would, incidentally, be one way of affirming that the blood of Rafik Hariri, who embraced Lebanon's particularities, was not expended cheaply.
Hazem Saghiyeh is a writer, commentator and columnist for Al-Hayat in London, and author
of books on pan-Arabism and political Islam. This commentary, written for THE DAILY STAR, is published in partnership with the Partners in Humanity program of the Search for
Common Ground News Service.
