How will the ascension of King Abdullah alter the future of Saudi Arabia
Riyadh - Political capital. For anyone in government, earning the good will of the people is the key to success. Every politician, whether he is the ruler of a mighty kingdom or the mayor of rural hamlet, must address the concerns of his core constituency. He accumulates precious political capital every time he is seen as doing the right thing, then can spend some of his earnings on something that's less popular.
In Saudi Arabia, where the laws of succession are written in lines of family blood, it might seem commonsensical to believe that the kingdom's new monarch wields absolute power and therefore doesn't have to worry about political capital - but that's also the furthest thing from the truth. The kingdom's political structures may be far different from those that exist elsewhere, and especially in the West, but that does not mean that its leadership can move faster, or slower, than the population wants. It does not mean that the government does not remain beholden to the people. It doesn't mean that, in the kingdom, political capital is any less important.
"King Abdullah, like all the Saudi kings before him, is someone who rules through consultation," insists Anthony Cordesman, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington who formerly served in the US Defense and State departments as well as at NATO.
"Abdullah has to take into account, like all previous kings at least since Abdul Aziz, that there are other senior princes, tribal leaders and heads of important families. This is something that is often overlooked because of the tendency to translate the Saudi monarchy into Western terms or to see the absence of some kind of formally elected parliament as something that allows the king to operate freely. But make no mistake: King Abdullah, like every other Saudi leader, is simply not an absolute monarch. His key goals will be like those of the kings who came before him: to ensure stability and development. "
Half-brother of the late King Fahd, who recently passed away following nearly a decade of incapacitation, King Abdullah is only the sixth man to lead the kingdom since independence in 1932. Like the four kings who immediately preceded him, Abdullah is a son of the founding monarch, King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud.
Crown prince since 1982 and de facto leader since King Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke in November 1995, Abdullah is likely to be one of the last of a generation of Saudi rulers whose childhood memories are of bedouin encampments among the desert sands.
King Abdullah was born in 1924, reared by his mother Asi al-Shuraim and schooled in both Islamic tradition and Arab history. Abdullah's father, Ibn Saud, sent his son to live with bedouin tribes for extended periods - to make him physically and mentally strong enough to someday take the throne. Appointed governor of Mecca in the 1950s, Abdullah was made head of the National Guard in the early 1960s, then named second deputy premier when King Khalid took power in 1975. All this time, unlike many of the younger generation of Saudi princes, Abdullah never attended university in the West, nor spend significant amounts of time overseas.
"When you meet Abdullah, it's so very clear that he comes from a different time and a different place," says Rachel Bronson, the director of Middle East and Gulf Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "When you meet Abdullah and the other sons of Abdul Aziz, it's as if you can feel the founding of the country. This was a desert potentate; these men were fighting on the sands of Arabia to unify their country. Abdullah comes out of that, and you feel that when you meet him. He has one foot in 2005 and the other in 1905."
"Abdullah has come to represent, rightly or wrongly, the vanishing bedouin ethos," agrees Tom Lippman, a former foreign correspondent for the Washington Post and author of Inside the Mirage, a new book on US-Saudi relations. "Abdullah is still more or less a man of the tribes, which a lot of the younger princes are not. He has probably never been within 500 miles of UCLA, if you know what I mean. Keep in mind that Fahd was at the UN conference in 1945; Abdullah has never been a world traveler of that kind. That's not who he is - and that's part of the reason why the country is comfortable with him."
"He is quite simply a very nice man," says Mai Yamani, a scholar at Chatham House in London and former lecturer at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. "Abdullah is respected; people like him, even when they are sometimes disappointed with the pace of reform. On the whole, he is viewed as concerned with poverty and as someone who is trying hard to find solutions."
King Abdullah has earned a reputation for clean living: among the general population, he is seen as a pious man who has not been corrupted by the kingdom's great wealth. While he generally travels by Rolls-Royce or in a specially equipped tour bus - complete with a spacious living room and satellite TV - Abdullah's tastes are mostly modest. Falconry, along with swimming, is among his favorite pastimes, and he is known as a skilled lawn bowler. Despite his age, Abdullah remains vigorous, rising at noon, working until seven, then napping until midnight, when he rises again to work until dawn prayers.
"I last saw King Abdullah in action in Texas this spring," says Lippman. "He seems to be a gracious but personally reserved individual, which is his reputation. He also has amazing stamina for someone his age: he stood in a reception line in a hotel in Dallas, and I watched him shake 600 hands with a smile that never left his face."
King Abdullah will certainly need that stamina as he takes over one of the world's most challenging jobs - at a time when the kingdom faces unprecedented challenges. The threat of terrorism remains the single greatest menace to the stability of the country, but it is not the only peril Abdullah will face. Unemployment, despite record oil prices, remains high; reform, especially of the kingdom's trade and investment structures, must be addressed simultaneously. Popular participation in government, the status of women, the educational system, infrastructure development, relations with key allies such as the United States - King Abdullah must navigate a new future for the country, all the while taking into account the various demands of his core constituencies.
There is little disagreement among the senior princes - including Crown Prince Sultan and Prince Nayef, the powerful interior minister - on the need for reform. But there is not a consensus on how best to move the country forward: where to start, how fast to move, with whom to make friends and whom to risk alienating. Further, each of the senior princes represents the views of a cross-section of the society as a whole. Abdullah may be a true populist - but not everyone shares his vision of the future.
Hardly anyone outside the royal court knows exactly what pressures King Abdullah faces. And it is telling that he has not yet named a second deputy premier - the man who will ascend the throne after Crown Prince Sultan. Few expect Abdullah to make this critical decision in the near future, but it will speak volumes about the direction he hopes the kingdom to take.
"When it comes to security issues, senior princes like Sultan and Nayef clearly agree with the king on the primacy of the fight against Al-Qaeda. There is a united front on that issue," says Yamani. "Reform, however, is a very different matter. There, we have seen divisions and very different orientations."
According to Rachel Bronson, "Abdullah's overriding characteristic is that he is cautious; he moves slowly. He is much slower than Fahd. Abdullah believes that it is very important to work issues through the tribes and religious establishment. In that way, he is a politician. He wants consensus and wants to work everything through the different channels of power.
"The best example of this is 1990 when the Americans - including Powell and Cheney - came and asked then King Fahd for an invitation for what would become 500,000 troops in the kingdom. Fahd said, 'Yes, fine.' But Abdullah said, 'Wait a minute. I think we're moving too fast. We need to check this with the tribes.' He's the only one who said that. The king replied, 'We don't have time. The Kuwaitis are now living outside their country in hotels, and if we don't do something we're going to end up there, too.'"
Abdullah's inclination to seek consensus may serve him very well as king, in particular when it comes to continued social and educational reforms. Like the late King Faisal, another of Abdullah's half-brothers, the current king should be able to take on the religious establishment on its own terms. Faisal was known for arguing the finer points of theology with the kingdom's clerics; Abdullah should be able to do the same. And because the general population sees him as devout, his arguments in favor of reform will carry weight in a country where, under the law, the raison d'tre of the state is not the welfare of the individual but the promulgation of Islam.
Many observers have made the comparison between Faisal and Abdullah; everyone has taken note of the change that took place in Washington shortly before the death of King Fahd. Early this summer, the kingdom's long-serving ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, son of the current crown prince, was recalled to Riyadh. Bandar was replaced by Saudi Arabia's former ambassador to Great Britain and head of intelligence, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Son of the late King Faisal and brother of the kingdom's foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, Turki could prove vital in reinvigorating relations between Riyadh and Washington.
"Fahd was very pro-American," argues Bronson. "That sounds strange, perhaps, because it seems like the Americans had so many problems with Saudi Arabia, but he was very pro-American. He put the eggs of the kingdom in the American basket. Faisal didn't do that; he was much more of a world diplomat who tried to figure out how to balance American needs with the needs of the kingdom. I think Abdullah is like Faisal in that respect. That may make for some more difficult negotiations, but in the end I think that relations will be healthier for it."
Personally reserved and fiercely intelligent, Prince Turki is likely to play hardball with Washington. Like his uncle, King Abdullah, Turki is not seen as an especially pro-American member of the royal family. While events in Iraq or Iran could radically reshape the regional security balance, for now Saudi Arabia can afford to take a harder line with the United States. US troops were withdrawn from the kingdom in April 2003, just days after Baghdad fell to American forces; oil prices have tipped $60 a barrel and show no sign of falling to the levels of the early 1990s. Quite simply, at least for now, America needs Saudi Arabia more than Saudi Arabia needs America.
"The joining of the interests of Saudi Arabia and the United States makes for the oddest couple ever," says Tom Lippman, whose book traces this relationship to its earliest days of American wildcatting in the desert sands. "Somehow, through good will and economic necessity, we have managed to make this relationship work for the benefit of both societies. Whether that will continue, now that the Saudis need the Americans so much less, I don't know."
Many observes believe that the appointment of Turki is reflective of Abdullah's negotiating strategy vis--vis Washington. "Turki will be able to work very easily with the Americans," says Bronson. "Turki isn't going to go in with a handshake and a pat on the back and say, 'We can do it.' He going to work the system; he'll ask what's in it for Saudi Arabia and what's in it for the United States. His father was like that and he's like that - and Abdullah is like that as well."
Expect the new Saudi monarch to push Washington hard for a Middle East peace settlement. Shortly before the events of September 11th, then Crown Prince Abdullah instructed Bandar to confront the Bush administration about its perceived pro-Israel stance. In essence, Abdullah's message to President Bush was to recognize the plight and rights of the Palestinians - or kiss the special relationship between the kingdom and Washington goodbye. Just days later, however, the Twin Towers fell. Overnight, the peace process was no longer at the top of anyone's agenda.
As monarch, Abdullah will certainly make the peace process among his foreign policy priorities. Indeed, this is an issue that, by all accounts, is very close to his heart. But, as in the past, acts of terrorism will continue to complicate even the very best intentions. The bombings in London, for instance, dramatically changed the game for Prime Minister Blair, who has long sought greater international, and especially American, attention to the conflict. As well, Ariel Sharon, who will soon face what is likely to be a difficult reelection campaign, is now seen by some Israelis as, of all things, someone who has shifted too far to the left.
King Abdullah, then, can push for a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians - but he cannot control external events that will continue to impact the process.
Other events far from the kingdom will also reshape Abdullah's relations with the United States and his plans for reform. Globalization, and especially the rise of India and China as economic superpowers thirsty for oil, is rapidly reshaping old alliances and simultaneously creating new ones. Saudi Arabia will be forced to make some very hard commercial decisions, sooner rather than later, that will impact its political relations with the world's only superpower. Abdullah, like every Saudi king before him, will have to play the oil card very carefully.
King Abdullah may have inherited the throne, but he has no mandate that gives him absolute power. As he charts a course for the future, he will seek to accrue political capital and then attempt to spend it wisely. He will forge new alliances - abroad and at home, and among the senior princes, the religious establishment and the millions of ordinary Saudis seeking greater economic opportunities. Abdullah must prove himself, as his father before him, to all these constituencies.
"Saudi Arabia is often described as an absolute monarchy," says Lippman. "But it is not one in the sense that France was under Louis XIV. It's a country that's run by a family, by the men mostly, of the House of Saud. And it's run by family consensus. While Abdullah is the king, he doesn't have a mandate or, if I know him, the desire to override the opinions and input of his senior brothers.
"I think it is fair to say that the House of Saud has mostly governed Saudi Arabia with the consent of the people," continues Lippman. "There's always some grumbling, but there has never been a serious movement to make change. The opposition is basically just six guys with a fax machine in London. There really has never been a serious opposition to the royal family. Consider that at the times of the greatest confrontation with the monarchy - the takeover of the Great Mosque at Mecca, the Al-Qaeda bombings in 1993 and 1994 - the opposition never got any traction with the population. It seems very clear that everyone has a stake in the stability of the government."
"You'll never see Abdullah do a CNN interview where he talks about the dialogue of civilizations. He will move quietly and behind the scenes," Bronson says. "The way power operates in the kingdom is fluid, depending on personalities. It is a monarchy in the sense that the king wields tremendous power, and it has made a difference that Abdullah has been crown prince and not king. There seemed to be things that he could not do because he could not bring the power of the throne to his decisions.
"Even now as king, as in any political structure, there are very important constituencies that Abdullah has to navigate: from the more Western-oriented to the more conservative in the kingdom, and including important religious and tribal figures, all of whom are represented by figures in the royal family. The only real way to judge the extent of Abdullah's authority will be to see what he actually does in the next two years. We'll all just have to wait and see."
By Laurence Clarke
Arabies Trends 2005
