08 October 2009
The performance of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan.
The SPLM has long drawn much of its legitimacy from its achievements in the civil war and, since 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It has also benefited from sympathy and support in Africa and the West. Nonetheless, it faces significant opposition and discontent in the south, and its authority is fragile.Go to conclusion
Under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is the ruling party in the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the junior partner of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan's national government. The SPLM is expected to compete in national and southern general elections in April 2010. A referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan is due to be held in 2011.
SPLM performance.
In general the SPLM has performed well in the political contest with the NCP over implementation of the CPA, to the extent that the CPA and GOSS have so far survived. However, on other issues the performance of the SPLM has been much weaker and, in places, very poor:
Southern politics
The SPLM has made little effort at south-south dialogue with other southern-based political parties, and it has done very little for reconciliation and to address grievances against the SPLM for inter-southern killings and abuses in the civil war. The only exception has been the 2006 Juba Declaration, which provided for the merger of the South Sudan Defence Forces into the southern army (and SPLM's armed wing), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
Security
The main improvement in security in Southern Sudan was brought by the end of the civil war in 2005 and the withdrawal of the national army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), from the south. However, since then, the SPLM has not done enough to maintain or improve security. The SPLA has conducted several coercive disarmament campaigns (in Jonglei State) and occasional arms collection sweeps (for example in Juba on September 11). However, in the past year inter-tribal clashes and criminal violence have become more frequent and more severe -- the UN estimates the death toll at well above 1,200 so far in 2009. The SPLM and GOSS have repeatedly accused the NCP of distributing arms in the south, to destabilise it. This remains possible, but a more fundamental problem is poor control of arms by the SPLA and a failure to establish security systems trusted by groups historically hostile to or distrustful of the SPLA.
Economy
The SPLM and GOSS's management of the southern economy has been characterised by poor controls on and minimal accountability for the use of public money. Although the economy in the south has grown (rapidly in Juba and substantially in other major towns), many southerners are disappointed by the scarcity of infrastructural improvements. On October 2, GOSS announced a plan to build the south's first oil refinery, in Warrap State. However the plan is still only on paper and no major international partner has been secured. In September, the Central Bank of Sudan bailed out Nile Commercial Bank, Southern Sudan's largest private bank, for the second time -- a sign of how poorly GOSS has regulated the south's small banking sector.
Corruption concerns
Despite calls by Salva Kiir -- the president of Southern Sudan and head of the SPLM -- for a campaign against corruption, the SPLM and GOSS have been almost totally ineffective at tackling corruption, in part because many figures are implicated. Combined with an influx of about 8 billion dollars in oil revenues since 2005, the result has been that waste and corruption have become endemic in the SPLM and GOSS:
Opacity
The SPLA accounts for about 30% of budgeted GOSS spending, but no breakdown of SPLA expenditure is publicly available. A number of senior SPLM figures have close links with southern businesses, for example in the areas of oil (such as Nilepet, the Southern Sudan state- owned oil company), construction, imports and other services. A southern Audit Chamber was established in 2007, but the auditor general, Barnabas Majok Barnabas, was dismissed in February 2008, on charges of misconduct. Majok claimed he was sacked because the GOSS did not want him to complete his audit of the Juba administration. Since then the work of the Audit Chamber has ground to a halt, and not a single audit report has been published.
Impunity. Several GOSS ministers (notably a past minister of finance) have been accused of corruption and suspended or moved. However, despite starting some investigations, the Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission has not managed to prosecute a single individual.
How the SPLM has managed government and the economy is not surprising when compared with the NCP or other unelected ruling parties in Africa and elsewhere. For comparison, the NCP has used its position as the ruling party for more than 20 years to appropriate businesses and assets, sometimes masking this with various state and parastatal creations.
Leadership deficit
The SPLM presents a concerted face in its dealings with the NCP. The top leadership of the party has been stable since the death of its former leader, John Garang, in 2005, and since the SPLM national convention in 2008.
Nonetheless, the party is strained by internal rivalries and divided loyalties, which have the potential to split the party and can lead to outbreaks of fighting between supporters:
Rivalries
Kiir's weak leadership makes him acceptable to the stronger figures behind him in the SPLM. Riek Machar -- GOSS vice-president and SPLM vice-chairman and Pagan Amum, SPLM secretary-general, are wary of each other's ambitions.
Clashes. On October 2, some twelve SPLA soldiers were killed in a clash in Unity State between guards of the SPLA deputy commander-in-chief and former SSDF leader, Paulino Matip, and those of the governor of Unity State, Taban Deng Gai. Such incidents occur because of rivalries between tribally-based militias and their leaders.
Rival parties
The SPLM continues to face popular and political opposition in the south, most of it fuelled by bitter inter-southern animosities:
SPLM-DC. The SPLM-Democratic Change party set up in June by Lam Akol -- a former senior SPLM figure and national foreign minister -- is small but well organised, and is trying to take votes away from the SPLM. A change in the SPLM leadership could lead Akol to rejoin the SPLM, but this is unlikely to happen before the elections next year.
Others. At the SPLM's all-party conference in Juba in late September, six southern-based parties including the South Sudan Democratic Forum, the United Democratic Front and the Union of Sudan African Parties 2 walked out, accusing the SPLM of renegotiating the CPA with northern-based opposition parties.
Rival southern parties have opportunistically exploited uncertainty in the SPLM's position on the question of whether Southern Sudan should become independent. The southern opposition parties cannot unseat the SPLM, but their activities frustrate the SPLM's control in the south and play into the hands of the NCP.
Conclusion
With its dominant position and the priority of the CPA, the SPLM is not under pressure to improve its performance in Southern Sudan. By the same token it will struggle to prevent deteriorations in security across the south.
© Oxford Analytica 2009
The performance of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan.
The SPLM has long drawn much of its legitimacy from its achievements in the civil war and, since 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It has also benefited from sympathy and support in Africa and the West. Nonetheless, it faces significant opposition and discontent in the south, and its authority is fragile.Go to conclusion
Under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is the ruling party in the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the junior partner of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan's national government. The SPLM is expected to compete in national and southern general elections in April 2010. A referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan is due to be held in 2011.
SPLM performance.
In general the SPLM has performed well in the political contest with the NCP over implementation of the CPA, to the extent that the CPA and GOSS have so far survived. However, on other issues the performance of the SPLM has been much weaker and, in places, very poor:
Southern politics
The SPLM has made little effort at south-south dialogue with other southern-based political parties, and it has done very little for reconciliation and to address grievances against the SPLM for inter-southern killings and abuses in the civil war. The only exception has been the 2006 Juba Declaration, which provided for the merger of the South Sudan Defence Forces into the southern army (and SPLM's armed wing), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
Security
The main improvement in security in Southern Sudan was brought by the end of the civil war in 2005 and the withdrawal of the national army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), from the south. However, since then, the SPLM has not done enough to maintain or improve security. The SPLA has conducted several coercive disarmament campaigns (in Jonglei State) and occasional arms collection sweeps (for example in Juba on September 11). However, in the past year inter-tribal clashes and criminal violence have become more frequent and more severe -- the UN estimates the death toll at well above 1,200 so far in 2009. The SPLM and GOSS have repeatedly accused the NCP of distributing arms in the south, to destabilise it. This remains possible, but a more fundamental problem is poor control of arms by the SPLA and a failure to establish security systems trusted by groups historically hostile to or distrustful of the SPLA.
Economy
The SPLM and GOSS's management of the southern economy has been characterised by poor controls on and minimal accountability for the use of public money. Although the economy in the south has grown (rapidly in Juba and substantially in other major towns), many southerners are disappointed by the scarcity of infrastructural improvements. On October 2, GOSS announced a plan to build the south's first oil refinery, in Warrap State. However the plan is still only on paper and no major international partner has been secured. In September, the Central Bank of Sudan bailed out Nile Commercial Bank, Southern Sudan's largest private bank, for the second time -- a sign of how poorly GOSS has regulated the south's small banking sector.
Corruption concerns
Despite calls by Salva Kiir -- the president of Southern Sudan and head of the SPLM -- for a campaign against corruption, the SPLM and GOSS have been almost totally ineffective at tackling corruption, in part because many figures are implicated. Combined with an influx of about 8 billion dollars in oil revenues since 2005, the result has been that waste and corruption have become endemic in the SPLM and GOSS:
Opacity
The SPLA accounts for about 30% of budgeted GOSS spending, but no breakdown of SPLA expenditure is publicly available. A number of senior SPLM figures have close links with southern businesses, for example in the areas of oil (such as Nilepet, the Southern Sudan state- owned oil company), construction, imports and other services. A southern Audit Chamber was established in 2007, but the auditor general, Barnabas Majok Barnabas, was dismissed in February 2008, on charges of misconduct. Majok claimed he was sacked because the GOSS did not want him to complete his audit of the Juba administration. Since then the work of the Audit Chamber has ground to a halt, and not a single audit report has been published.
Impunity. Several GOSS ministers (notably a past minister of finance) have been accused of corruption and suspended or moved. However, despite starting some investigations, the Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission has not managed to prosecute a single individual.
How the SPLM has managed government and the economy is not surprising when compared with the NCP or other unelected ruling parties in Africa and elsewhere. For comparison, the NCP has used its position as the ruling party for more than 20 years to appropriate businesses and assets, sometimes masking this with various state and parastatal creations.
Leadership deficit
The SPLM presents a concerted face in its dealings with the NCP. The top leadership of the party has been stable since the death of its former leader, John Garang, in 2005, and since the SPLM national convention in 2008.
Nonetheless, the party is strained by internal rivalries and divided loyalties, which have the potential to split the party and can lead to outbreaks of fighting between supporters:
Rivalries
Kiir's weak leadership makes him acceptable to the stronger figures behind him in the SPLM. Riek Machar -- GOSS vice-president and SPLM vice-chairman and Pagan Amum, SPLM secretary-general, are wary of each other's ambitions.
Clashes. On October 2, some twelve SPLA soldiers were killed in a clash in Unity State between guards of the SPLA deputy commander-in-chief and former SSDF leader, Paulino Matip, and those of the governor of Unity State, Taban Deng Gai. Such incidents occur because of rivalries between tribally-based militias and their leaders.
Rival parties
The SPLM continues to face popular and political opposition in the south, most of it fuelled by bitter inter-southern animosities:
SPLM-DC. The SPLM-Democratic Change party set up in June by Lam Akol -- a former senior SPLM figure and national foreign minister -- is small but well organised, and is trying to take votes away from the SPLM. A change in the SPLM leadership could lead Akol to rejoin the SPLM, but this is unlikely to happen before the elections next year.
Others. At the SPLM's all-party conference in Juba in late September, six southern-based parties including the South Sudan Democratic Forum, the United Democratic Front and the Union of Sudan African Parties 2 walked out, accusing the SPLM of renegotiating the CPA with northern-based opposition parties.
Rival southern parties have opportunistically exploited uncertainty in the SPLM's position on the question of whether Southern Sudan should become independent. The southern opposition parties cannot unseat the SPLM, but their activities frustrate the SPLM's control in the south and play into the hands of the NCP.
Conclusion
With its dominant position and the priority of the CPA, the SPLM is not under pressure to improve its performance in Southern Sudan. By the same token it will struggle to prevent deteriorations in security across the south.
© Oxford Analytica 2009
