But legitimacy is a political, not a technical, matter. Even after the rubber stamping by an emasculated parliament and weakened provincial legislatures, it is doubtful whether Musharraf can overcome his regime's crisis of legitimacy.
During the course of the LFO negotiations, the general explained that he did not want to contest presidential elections because that would be beneath his dignity. Lowly politicians run for office. Generals are a higher breed and must not stoop to the level of politicians. But the general has now secured office through a brokered deal involving politicians, and that too from a faction that has little in common with his internationally pro-claimed secular ideology.
A world that is already suspicious of his intentions is unlikely to be impressed by Musharraf's embrace of political Islamists. For his domestic critics, the reluctance to face even a fragmented political opposition on a level playing field is evidence that the general's claims of popular support have little or no basis.
It has been argued that the deal over the LFO and the subsequent votes of confidence have strengthened Musharraf's hand. Having brought the political Islamists on board he can now deal with militant Islamists something that should improve Pakistan's performance in the global war against terrorism. But the reverse could also be true.
Musharraf and Pakistan's military-dominated establishment have tried to impress the world with the notion that the Islamists are waiting in the wings in case the Musharraf regime falters. Since an Islamist-dominated Pakistan is not an option in the post- 9/11 world, the assumption is that international support would continue to come the general's way.
But international support is hardly a substitute for domestic legitimacy. And the aprs moi les Islamistes (after me the Islamists) approach requires keeping the secular political opposition suppressed while maintaining the Islamists as a political force. The trouble with such an approach, which is already being practiced in Egypt and Algeria, is that it stunts the nation's political growth. Ideologues of all varieties, including Islamists, are capable of spawning extremist off-shoots not all of whom can be managed or controlled by the security apparatus that hopes to use them.
A cursory look at Pakistan's history reveals three major fault lines. The first of these relates to the ideological division over the role of Islam in national life. Starting out as a pressure group outside parliament, Pakistan's religious parties have now become a well-armed and well-financed force wielding considerable influence within different branches of government.
The second major source of conflict in Pakistan is ethnic and provincial. Highly centralised and unrepresentative governance has resulted in creating grievances among different ethnic groups. The level of discontent of one group or another has varied from time to time, but the state has not evolved institutional mechanisms for dealing with such discontent.
The third, and potentially most significant, crack in Pakistan's body-politic is the perennial dispute over who should wield political power and how. Musharraf not long ago described Pakistan as "the most the difficult country to govern." The root of this difficulty is the absence of agreed ground rules for the conduct of politics. Pakistan's rulers are reduced to managing ethnic and religious tensions and juggling between the country's various fault lines.
In the absence of democratic practice, ideological and ethnic divisions can be played upon by a vocal minority, which can seem disproportionately significant because of its agitation potential. Military-bureaucratic governments, including the present regime, often fail to secure popular support for their policies.
Pakistan needs to get back on the path of normal political and economic development. To do this, it must address its internal crises. A government backed by a popular mandate and subject to transparent political rules is crucial for political normalcy. Technical manoeuvers, whether involving judicial endorsement for military rule or legislative machinations expressing confidence in a General-President, do not help in creating normal politics.
Pakistani columnist Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He served as adviser to Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and as Pakistan's ambassador to Sri Lanka
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