29 June 2005

EXPERT BRIEFING Anthony H. Cordesman

One of the most critical decisions we will make during the next decade is whether to stay the course in Iraq. No one can establish the odds of long-term success, but they seem to be about 50-50. The case cannot be made on the basis that there are not serious risks of failure. There are such risks, and success will be a matter of two to three more years in terms of defeating terrorism and insurgency, and five to 10 years of gradually phased down U.S. and international assistance in building true political and economic stability.

The case for staying the course must be made on the basis that there are also serious chances of success, and that we have essentially created a situation where we have a moral and ethical responsibility to make the best possible effort to help the Iraqi people, as well as vital strategic interests in a region with some 60 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 40 percent of its gas. It is also true that any U.S. withdrawal, no matter how it is presented to the world, will be seen as a massive victory by Sunni Islamic extremists, risk dividing the Sunni and Shiite portions of Islam into a serious clash within a civilization, threaten our friends and allies in the region, and seriously discredit or undercut efforts at reform.

There are positive developments in Iraq. The risk of serious civil conflict remains all too real, but the new Iraqi political leadership was impressive when I talked with its members in Baghdad. Ministers understand the need for an inclusive political system and seem committed to making efforts to create one. They are resisting the provocations of Sunni Islamic extremist terrorist attacks, and pressures to purge the ministries and armed forces.

Real progress is being made in creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces. These are the key to our ability to stay the course in terms of giving the new government legitimacy, replacing coalition forces with Iraqi forces the people can trust, and reducing the burden on U.S. and allied forces.

Even with such support, success in creating effective Iraqi forces will still be uncertain. However, the chances of success are great enough to tip the balance in favor of staying the course, and pursuing a success strategy and not an exit strategy.

We must avoid some kind of artificial timetable for withdrawal as:

(1) No one can (as yet) predict the rate at which Iraqi military and police units can deploy and hold up in combat.

(2) Any dates become targets for the insurgents.

(3) Any missed dates give Islamists ammunition to charge the U.S. intends to stay, and will lead some of the more anti-U.S. Shiite factions to raise the same issues.

At the same time, changing the odds in favor of staying the course requires two major shifts in U.S. policy.

The first shift is to recognize both the seriousness of the economic challenges Iraq faces, the failures in the present economic aid effort and the incompetence with which it is being shaped in Washington.

We need a presidential commission to examine the reasons for the failures to date, the lack of meaningful planning, honest reporting, and useful measures of success. Such steps, however, can only help us in dealing with future problems in stability operations and nation-building.

The immediate task is to give the U.S. embassy team in the field, and the multinational force in Iraq, full flexibility in using short term aid in ways that can promote political stability and defeat the insurgency with an absolute minimum of interference and second guessing from Washington. The task is also to act immediately to transfer the planning and management of the medium and long-term aid effort to Iraqi hands, subject to U.S. vetting and auditing.

The second shift is for the Bush administration to stop talking down to the Congress and American people, and present an honest and in-depth assessment of its strategy for helping Iraq. This means honestly admitting the risks, the time it will take to succeed, and the necessary sacrifices in dollars and blood.

To put it bluntly, the time has come to stop preaching to the converted in terms of slogans and false reassurances. The administration must honestly explain what it will actually take to help create an inclusive government, the challenges in bringing effective Iraqi forces on-line, and the need for construction of an Iraqi economy and the levels of aid required. It means real courage in leadership, not mere obstinacy.

As part of this effort, the U.S. needs a public diplomacy that provides equal depth. It must also refute the present conspiracy theories that poison U.S.-Iraqi relations on a point by point basis. This includes a firm statement that the U.S. will not seek any advantage in terms of financial interests or control of Iraqi oil and the Iraqi economy. It means a firm statement that the U.S. will not seek permanent bases in Iraq, and will limit its advisory presence to the level desired by an elected Iraqi government. It means declaring the U.S. will leave the moment an elected Iraqi government asks it to and that it will phase down its presence in Iraqi affairs as soon as Iraq feels it is ready to act on its own.

The U.S. needs to explain how it will recast its aid efforts, how they affect the overall building of a modern Iraqi economy, and the role Iraqis will have in planning and managing such aid.

The U.S. also needs to clearly recognize the contribution key allies like Britain, Australia, other participants in the coalition, and NATO have made and to stop conducting public affairs in U.S.-centric terms. It also needs a clear strategy for expanding the role of the UN and other nations; even if the resulting contributions fall short, the U.S. must constantly and visibly try.

Anthony H. Cordesman is Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.