Monday, May 01, 2006
By Frank Kennedy, Special to Gulf News
Comments made in this column ("RINA under spotlight over ferry sinking" Sea Views February 13, 06) have proved entirely accurate regarding the lack of a credible safety management system aboard the ferry Al Salam Boccaccio 98 that sank in the Red Sea on February 3 with the loss of more than 1,000 lives.
Fairplay has quoted comments from another maritime safety expert who says the transcript of bridge conversations aboard the vessel just before it sank was "deeply distressing" and that there was "little or no semblance of a working Safety Management System (SMS) on board."
Dr Phil Anderson, managing director of Consult ISM in the UK, said evidence from the transcript painted a "stark and deeply distressing" picture. The evidence suggests that the master, officers and crew "had little or no idea how to respond to the most basic and fundamental 'emergency shipboard situation' i.e. a fire on board." Dr Anderson added, "The indecision, lack of leadership, disorganised and unstructured response would suggest to me that there could not have been any meaningful or effective 'drills or exercises' carried out by the individuals involved on board that ship" as required under Section 8.2 of the ISM Code. The master's delay in involving the ship's operator, Cairo-based El Salam Maritime Transport, until it was too late suggested that the master did not recognise the option as being part of an emergency response plan.
From the initial indicators, the 'Sea Views' lead article had suggested this scenario, also commenting on the fact that the ship only had interim ISM certification could be an indicator that all was not well with the company's safety management system and that it required very close examination why a ship that was carrying so many passengers should have such certification.
The article also went on to say that if deficiencies in the onboard SMS were found to be relevant in this accident, any enquiry will probably uncover uncomfortable truths about implementation and compliance of the ISM Code both onboard the ship and within the company ashore. This statement is now coming to fruition, but one of the sad, salient and cold facts is that such predictions were not difficult to make, and the article of February 13, also said this is a region where the policing of 'compliance' is seriously flawed and so often not as stringent as elsewhere in the world (such as EU and US). Moreover, the standards demonstrated of 'enforcement' by some regional Port State Control (PSC) authorities amounted to a 'joke'.
The Classification Society of the vessel, Registro Italiano Navale (RINA), is currently co-operating with the official investigation into the accident and last week understandably declined to make any comments about reports from "other bodies". However, a statement did stress that the operator of any vessel is responsible for managing and implementing the ISM Code and the ship's master is responsible for its onboard management and implementation. Furthermore, regarding the 'Al Salam Boccaccio 98', RINA had checked everything relating to the ISM certification of the vessel and the Society was confident that it had fully discharged its duties and responsibilities as an auditing body under the ISM Code. It went on to say that it had been "completely open and transparent" about the facts, but for it to take part in public or press debate about possible causes or consequences would not be helpful.
In spotlight
It was again headline news at the end of March in Bahrain, when more lives were lost in a marine accident ("A tragedy waiting to happen" Sea Views April 3) and while this accident did not concern a 'mainstream' part of the marine industry it nevertheless served to demonstrate, yet again, that all is not well with maritime compliance in this region. The fact that such commercial activities have been allowed to flourish afloat, without effective regulation and without properly implemented standards is exceedingly worrying.
On the other hand, as the Class Society for the Egyptian ferry, RINA has been under the spotlight, and rightly so, but it could just have easily been one of the other IACS members since all such third-party regulatory bodies become part of the process of investigation when an accident occurs. Such is the system and such is the process to minimise future risk. Furthermore, as RINA rightly says, it is the responsibility of the operator and master to ensure compliance and implementation, but if there is nothing with which to comply, and nothing to implement herein lies a serious deficiency far more fundamental than non-conformities with existing regulations and this is a void apparently present in so many aspects of a credible safety culture (across all industries) in this region.
- The writer is a Dubai-based marine consultant.
Gulf News 2006. All rights reserved.
