The containerization, during the last two decades, had been one of the key drivers in the growth of international trade and globalisation in the world. But since 9/11, the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons being surreptitiously moved in an anonymous container by terrorists has made the container security one of the major issues of the current times.
In the following article Hamad Mohd. Kadfoor Al Mehairi, managing partner and Attorney at Law, Emirates Advocates & Legal Consultants, discusses the issues involved and remedial initiatives being taken at present - Editor.
Containerized system has generally been accepted as the main mode of cargo transportation in global trade. This system is considered as faster, more economical and highly efficient than the conventional system of transporting goods by sea. However, there are a number of crimes and challenges relating to this system. These persistent crime-challenges include theft of goods and vehicles, illegal immigration, and transport of dangerous goods and drugs, and contraband smuggling etc. After the September 11 attacks in the United States, transport authorities of most of the developed countries realized that they need to be vigilant to potential terrorist threats or attacks targeting cargo ships.
Among these challenges and threats, one in particular has consistently been cited for being extremely important and requiring a coordinated international cooperation, this is the possible misuse by terrorists of the container transport system.
Containerized system is both an essential and massively complex system that can be likened to the global economy's circulatory system. The system is supported by a web of specialized terminals and handling facilities, transport operators, freight integrators and other actors as well as multiple strands of information flows. All these have co-evolved with the conception of the idea of delivering steel boxes to the right destination at the right time. The ubiquity of these containers was, and is still, seen as the system's principal strength and sign of success.
In particular, the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon (CBRN) being delivered via an anonymous shipping container has made it to the forefront transport security debate, which has become a principal driver of international transport security policy since 2001. This has a direct impact on transport authorities as they are charged with ensuring the efficient flow of goods while at the same time ensuring that the parts of the container transport chain under their jurisdiction are as secure as possible. The spectre of containers being used to deliver CBRN weapons requires a comprehensive intermodal framework integrating measures across the entire container transport chain. In maritime, such framework may exist at the center of the chain covering ports and maritime transport as codified in SOLAS and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). There is no such kind of framework governing the inland transport which relate to the outer edges of the chain.
Addressing the Weak Links
One of the recognized difficulties in addressing the security of the container transport chain is that there is no single system governing the international movement of containers. In fact the opposite is true - container transport is characterized by complex interactions among multiple network such as industries, regulatory agencies, modes, operating systems, liability regimes, legal frameworks and others.
Security Measures to be Adopted
Specific security measures must be adapted to specific terrorist modus operandi. Terrorists targeting the container transport chain will likely use one of the two approaches, namely: (1) they will intercept a legitimate consignment and tamper with it (the highjack scenario); or (2) will usurp and/or develop a legitimate trading identity to ship an illegitimate and dangerous consignment (the Trojan horse scenario).
Generally, the measures used to mitigate the threat of these scenarios fall into five groups: i) container scanning, ii) ensuring the integrity of the container itself, iii) controlling access to the container, iv) tracking containers, and v) assessing container risk through the analysis of trade-related data. However, not all of these measures are equally suited to counteract both the "highjack container" and "Trojan horse" threats as described above.
What will work to one scenario will not necessarily work for the other.
Recommendations
The mandatory framework of SOLAS and the ISPS Code governs the security measures for international ocean-going vessels and ports in international trade. However, there is some concern that the July 1, 2004 deadline for ISPS has not been taken seriously by some vessel operators and/or ports. At a minimum, Maritime Authorities should ensure that ports and vessels under their ultimate authority comply with the terms of the ISPS Code; strictly enforce ISPS Code compliance by vessels entering the ports after July 1, 2004 deadline; ensure that many of the basic provisions of the ISPS extend to those vessels and ports not covered by the ISPS; and countries may extend the coverage of ISPS which is limited to port facilities and terminals, to the entire ports as well as to adjacent areas where these have direct or indirect impact on the port like rail facilities, warehouses, etc.
Container Security Initiative
Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a new maritime regulation implemented by the U.S. Customs Service in response to the rising need to regulate security measures in the container system of the United States. It is intended to prevent containerized shipping from being exploited by terrorists. With CSI, the U.S. Customs Service has entered into partnerships with other governments to identify high risk cargo containers and pre-screen those containers from terrorist weapons at the port of departure instead of the port of arrival.
At present, countries participating in CSI with the United States are Canada in North America; Spain, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece and the United Kingdom in Europe; Singapore, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the UAE and China in Asia and South Africa in Africa. The early success of CSI is the result of outstanding cooperative efforts between countries on a bilateral basis. This kind of cooperation in addressing the terrorist threat is imperative for success in the global campaign against terrorism. Terrorism impacts the whole humanity and the world community must work together to conquer it.
© Cargo & Trade 2005
