Tuesday, May 28, 2013
By turning the National Guard into a ministry and appointing his son Prince Miteb bin Abdullah as its head, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud has continued the significant reorganization of the Kingdom’s security establishment.
According to media reports, the Ministry of the National Guard replaced the Presidency of the National Guard and the Minister of the National Guard swapped posts with the Commander of the National Guard. For all practical purposes, the Guard now occupies an equivalent position to that held by the Ministry of Defense within the government, and while its writ to defend the ruling family differed from that entrusted to the army, navy and air force units, the monarch’s latest decision illustrate his impatience with the regular armed forces.
Although one may conclude that that a check-and-balance system was created to manage internal rivalries among princes controlling different agencies, in reality the effort was yet another building block in the ruler’s vision to strengthen the defense establishment and, if possible, to eliminate or at least limit pockets of incompetence.
Riyadh’s defense organization follows a pattern typical in most states: the ruler as Commander-in-Chief, a Defense and Aviation Minister supervising the entire military establishment, Interior troops for police and public security duty, a National Guard to enforce internal security for the ruling family, and commanders and their subordinates serving in the Air Force, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Border Guards. The King, the Defense and Aviation Minister, the Commander of the Saudi National Guard, and the Interior Minister—all members of the Al Saud ruling family—formulate the Kingdom’s defense policy and implement its arms procurement initiatives. Comparisons to other military organizations cease at this point, however.
First, and unlike other countries, the religious elites play a role in the Kingdom’s defense policy. Although not part of the military structure per se, the senior religious figures (‘Ulamah) nevertheless participate in the political decision-making process that, for all practical purposes, is intimately tied to military matters. At times, defense issues have required the formal approval of the ‘Ulamah to implement specific policy objectives. For example, the ruler urged the ‘Ulamah to issue religious decrees (fatwas), allowing Riyadh to use force against rebels entrenched in the holy shrines in Makkah in 1979. Decrees were also issued to justify the government’s call on coalition forces to deploy troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1990-1991 War for Kuwait.
Second, and according to several observers, instability within the Saudi decision-making order was the result of frequent intra-family contentions. Since the Kingdom is an oligarchy, Saudi elite behavior sometimes places constraints on the decision-making process, especially when its security is threatened. In turn, leading personalities play key roles in military purchases that balance one “group” or “faction” against another.
Since 1982 senior members of the family have used their positions to advance preferences and interests every time the Kingdom purchased a new system or agreed to upgrade an existing one. After 2005, King Abdullah was not only anxious to upgrade equipment and services acquired from a variety of sources, but he also wished to see the armed forces perform. Highly critical of un-ending negotiations between sellers and the regular armed forces, the King halted these whenever intra-family discord erupted over the pace and scale of arms purchases, which partly explained the recent high-level personnel changes, especially the demotion of Deputy Defense Minister Bandar bin Sultan.
Third, and because of clearly defined responsibilities, questions have been raised as to why the monarch wishes to create yet another layer of bureaucracy at a time when the Guard is already a fully established and functioning institution. Inasmuch as the monarch led the Guard for decades and literally knew most of those who served in it—drawn from trusted tribes—he perceived them through true professional eyes. Therefore, the decree that changed its status was not about the Guard’s influence, which was intact, but about its long-term role in the country. Simply stated, the King perceived his Guardsmen to be both loyal as well as competent, two requirements that facilitated the work of senior officials.
King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud is not shy about his “will to power.” Over the years, the monarch has wished to see the armed forces perform better than heretofore tolerated. As the disastrous war with Yemeni Houthis in 2009 illustrated, some of the challenges facing the Kingdom were the product of confusion and poor performances, which prompted him to move with various permutations. It now remains to be determined whether the new Ministry of the National Guard will see its mission expanded to include tasks heretofore assigned to the regular armed forces.
By Joseph A. Kchichian?Senior Writer
Gulf News 2013. All rights reserved.
