A better European bridge to Turkey

Wednesday, Nov 24, 2004

The question of Turkey's possible entry to the European Union provokes passionate debate and the widest variety of arguments. In favour of Turkey's entry are the time that has elapsed since accession was promised, the insult which a refusal would represent for the Muslim world, the progress the country has made, and the risk of aggravating a clash between civilisations. Against accession are the fact that five-sixths of Turkey's territory, and its capital city, are located outside Europe, the size of its population, the economic and social consequences of the arrival of the poorest country in the Union, the existence of a huge Turkish-speaking community outside Turkish territory, and the strangeness for Europe of suddenly sharing its borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran.

In short, there are many arguments dividing opinion. In France itself, although the President of the Republic said on October 26 in Berlin: "my sincerest wish is that we can arrive at the end of this process, which will take ten to 15 years, with the possibility of accession", 64% of French people surveyed said they were against it.

Can we hope to bring a little reason to this debate? France can help to clarify it, but must do so without prejudice or passion, and by striving to get to the crux of the matter: what is the fairest way, and the most appropriate in view of the given objectives, to organize relations between Turkey and the European Union in future decades?

Let us look at the first two arguments: the promises made to Turkey, and the refusal to accept an Islamic state in the Union.

The commitments made in the 1960s took place in a different context. Then, the question was whether Turkey would enter the 'Common Market', which was exclusively economic in nature. It can be said that these commitments were fulfilled when the European Union signed a customs union treaty with Turkey in 1995, giving it access to this Market.

The opponents of accession are often accused by its advocates of refusing to countenance Turkish entry to the European Union for reasons of religion. We must be categorical on this point: the majority religion of the Turkish people is not an argument for the acceptance or rejection of Turkey's application! Moreover, the European Union may grant entry to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state whose culture is Islamic, when civil peace and democratic maturity are achieved in the former Yugoslavia.

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Just as religion is not an appropriate argument for opposing Turkey's application, it cannot be used to justify it. Would Turkish accession to the European Union prevent the country from sliding into Muslim fundamentalism? Nobody knows. The intensity of religious conviction depends on internal factors, but also on feelings of solidarity with neighbouring Muslim countries. It might seem more natural to the Turks to form partnerships with these neighbours, than to change their legislation to comply with the model used by a distant Brussels.

Let us put this mass of contradictory questions to one side.

The Treaty on European Union states, in Article 1-58, that 'Any European State wishing to become a member of the Union should address its application to the Council (à) The Council will rule unanimously'. This is therefore an area in which each Member State has a right of veto. The same applies in the draft European Constitution.

Is Turkey a 'European State'? The National Geographic Atlas of the World puts it in Asia. It is true that Turkey still has a small European enclave, but this represents only 5% of its territory and 8% of its population. The remainder is located in Asia, on the Anatolian Plateau, where the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, decided to move the country's capital.

Turkey has a short border with its two European neighbours, Greece and Bulgaria; a very long border with Syria and Iraq, the Middle Eastern countries which once belonged to the Ottoman Empire; and finally a shared border with Iran and Armenia. The Turkish people have their own language and culture. Turkish does not belong to the large family of Indo-European languages.

Today, Turkey's population of close to 73 million is greater than that of any of the European States, with the sole exception of Germany. The demographic forecasts of the United Nations state that in 20 years, Turkey will be the leading State in the European Union in terms of its population, which by then will have reached 89 million. In the same time period, the populations of Germany, France and the United Kingdom will grow to 82, 64 and 63 million respectively. The people of Turkey are also part of a wider Turkish-speaking population, with whom they share feelings of solidarity, extending eastwards to the Central Asian States such as Turkmenistan.

The standard of living in Turkey is still far below the European average. Revenue per head of population is half that of the ten newest Member States and only a fifth of that of the 15. The structure of Turkey's economy, while it has made substantial progress in recent years, is still far removed from the European 'norm'. Agricultural production still accounts for 14% of GDP, prompting the European Commissioner for Agriculture to state that 'the cost to the European budget of the entry of Turkish agriculture alone would exceed the cost of the entry of the ten new members'.

The current uncertainty surrounding the European project and the scepticism with which it is viewed by European citizens û confirmed by the majority of abstentions in the European elections û is due to the project's lack of clarity. Exactly which Europe are we talking about? Progressive enlargement has led to increasing unease. Where will this headlong expansion lead a European Union which is not yet properly organized, which is not very effective and which has dwindling democratic support from its population?

Europeans need to strengthen their identity. No 'European patriotism' can exist until European citizens realize that they belong to a single entity.

The European Convention sought a clearer definition of the foundations of this entity, which include the cultural contributions of ancient Greece and Rome, the religious heritage pervading European life, the creative enthusiasm of the Renaissance, the philosophy of the Age of the Enlightenment and the contributions of rational and scientific thought. Turkey shares none of these. This statement is not meant to be pejorative! Turkey has simultaneously developed its own history and its own culture, which deserve respect. However, we must objectively acknowledge that the foundations of our identity, so vital to the cohesion of the European Union today, are different.

Accession by Turkey, whenever it took place, would make that country the major decision-maker in the European Union, and would change the nature of the European project.

First of all, it could not be an isolated case.

There is already a queue forming in the east and west. The Ukrainian political crisis is in part focused on the question of accession to the European Union. Morocco would probably be tempted to follow Turkey's example. This could result in a process of permanent enlargement, destabilising the operations of the European system and removing its original rationale.

Secondly, population levels are an essential part of the regulation of the operations of the European institutions, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

The number of parliamentary deputies is capped at 750, and is divided between the States in proportion to their populations, with an adjustment in favour of the smallest States and a cap of 96 members per State. If it acceded, Turkey would represent just over 15% of the population of the Union. It would therefore have 96 members, the same number as Germany. To make room for these new deputies, the number of other representatives, and particularly those of the UK, France and Italy, would have to be reduced.

Under the Constitution, the Council of Ministers will apply the double majority system, meaning that decisions can only be adopted after approval by 55% of the States, representing 65% of the population. With its 15%, Turkey would be central to decision-making. Bear in mind the vehement opposition by Spain and Poland to double majority voting, which would mean the loss of only a few of their points. Turkey's entry would mean the loss of 15!

In order to avoid a situation in which the latest arrival to the Union û naturally lacking experience of how it works - became the main decision-maker, the Constitution would have to be rewritten, and a cap established to take account of the populations of Member States. Given the debate which this question provoked at the Convention, the chances of reaching a new version, acceptable to all, seem slim.

Let me make this absolutely clear: the question of Turkey's entry must not be one of rejection or contempt, but quite the opposite.

It is because Turkey has become a large country in terms of scale and demographics that it presents a problem for Europe in terms of its dimensions. It already carries such weight (and will carry even more in the future) that it would create an imbalance in the community structure, which is already very fragile and designed for other purposes. Constitutions are not catch-all formulae to which we can simply add the names of new arrivals. All the constitutions, whether American, French or European, are meticulously constructed and the result of compromises imposed by current needs. The fact is that the European Constitution which we are called upon to ratify today was not designed to accommodate a power the size of Turkey.

What is most surprising about this question is the way in which most European leaders have let themselves be drawn into the simplistic deadlock of whether to agree to negotiations towards Turkey's accession to the European Union, or whether to close the door in its face. How did this meagre and oversimplified choice come about? Other countries know better how to manage these problems. The United States, Canada and Mexico have as many û or more û similarities to each other as Europe and Turkey, and yet nobody talks about uniting them. Instead they have painstakingly built a free trade zone and practise bilateral cooperation.

Europe needs to bring creativity and imagination back into its relations with its neighbours; including Turkey, of course, but also Russia and the Mediterranean region. If the only solution it can come up with is allowing entry to the Union or antagonizing its partners, the European Union is doomed to slide towards becoming a regional version of the United Nations, a structure designed for meeting, dialogue and certain specific cooperative projects. If this were the case, it would have no identity, no common will and no role to play. The world would evolve without Europe if it were marginalised in this way.

Negotiations with Turkey should not, therefore, be focused on accession, but should explore the nature of the links which can be forged by the European Union with its largest neighbours. Let us try to be concrete: in economic matters, anything is possible, but can only be gradual; in matters of politics, nothing works but cooperation, organized to satisfy all the parties involved. The European Union has to show that it is capable of making a sophisticated, honourable and precise proposal to Turkey without further delay.

It is no accident that the European Convention proposes the insertion in the Constitution of Article 57, allowing the European Union to negotiate privileged partnership agreements with its neighbours. The text is the result of an in-depth examination of the way in which the European Union can respond to the legitimate requests of its neighbours to the east, the south-east and the south, without compromising its own nature.

Here there is a clear conclusion to be drawn: in December, the European Council should decide to open negotiations to establish a common area of economic prosperity, and to set up permanent structures for political cooperation, which would create a privileged partnership between Turkey and the European Union.

This, it seems to me, is the kind of constructive and realistic attitude which would allow for progress, by responding to Turkey's expectations without jeopardizing the fragile construction of the European Union, which has not yet adjusted to the institutional and budgetary consequences of the latest enlargement.

This proposal should, of course, be actively supported by France, (which has the benefit, with its partners, of the experience of founding the Union) in order to bring about a unanimous decision.

We have been concerning ourselves with Turkey a good deal recently. Is it not time to give more thought to Europe?

The writer is former president of France and president of the European Convention

Valery Giscard d'Estaing