Government leaders, diplomats and analysts worldwide have been consistently impressed by the way that Qatar has leveraged its soft power assets throughout the course of the Arab Spring. Whether it was the question of arming Libyan rebels, supporting Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, or being the first Arab country to close its embassy in Syria, there was a period when Qatar seemed to be gently guiding the course of history for an entire region. Not bad for a tiny Gulf state with under two million people, the majority of whom are foreign workers.

Qatar's activist foreign policy has been a resounding success so far, but this success has come at the cost of the country's perceived neutrality. And now comes the next phase, when, having officially entered the fray, Qatar begins to accumulate enemies that found themselves on the wrong side of Doha's regional interests.

This is inevitable to a certain degree because, as the saying goes, "you need to break a few eggs to make an omelette." But Qatar will need to proceed carefully and be mindful of not exceeding the limits of its own soft power, especially now that its desire for a larger role in the region is widely known.

For example, the support for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring represented a win-win insofar that it got a foot in the door of Egyptian politics while ostensibly aligning with the democratisation rhetoric of its ally in Washington. As such, it was heralded a foreign policy success for Qatar, drawing acclaim from both domestic and international audiences. Yet as this support continues, it is increasingly interpreted as foreign meddling in Egyptian domestic politics, which in turn risks alienating large parts of the Egyptian population. This perception - that Qatar is supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and not the state itself - is currently spreading among the secular opposition in both Egypt and Tunisia, and it's dangerous to Qatari interests because it could potentially wipe out all of its gains at the stroke of one democratic transition.

Syria is another Arab Spring success story that might come back to haunt Qatar in the future. Qatar didn't merely play the role of a trailblazer in Syria, leading the international charge to isolate the Assad government. Rather, it has actively enabled the conflict by arming opposition groups and rallying international support for their cause, most recently by pushing for opposition groups to take over Syria's vacant seat in the Arab League. Qatar is "all in" in the case of Syria, and there is no guarantee that when the dust settles and a new normal emerges in the Middle East, it will be one that benefits Qatari interests. On the contrary, Qatar may one day find itself being blamed  for the regional conflict. Such are the risks of an activist foreign policy, risks that neutrality used to preclude.

Thus, in a sense, by over-leveraging its soft power assets, Qatar risks bringing its own hard power deficiencies into sharper relief when its list of regional enemies starts to fill out. Furthermore, since soft power is an intangible, abstract concept that is somewhat analogous to influence (or getting states to align with your interests without threatening them), it's therefore possible to deplete the utility of soft power assets if they are abused or used excessively. For example, the United States' interests might be served by NGOs promoting democracy worldwide, but if these NGOs are found to be installing pro-US governments, then they lose the confidence of the local population and begin to exert a drag on US interests. Similarly, Al Jazeera is undeniably a powerful tool, as it whispers Qatar-styled truths in the ears of large swathes of people throughout the Middle East. Yet if there was a widespread conviction that these truths were completely skewed towards foreign policy goals, then Al Jazeera would suddenly become a far less effective tool.

In other words, soft power works best when people aren't aware it's being used.The more it's used, the more conspicuous it becomes.

This brings us back to Qatar, and how it can best follow up its string of foreign policy successes during the Arab Spring. Ironically, there might actually be some merit to Russia's UN jab that Qatar should "get back to its size," as this would take the spotlight off Qatar's soft power assets and thus replenish their effectiveness. If Doha wants to realise the social development goals set out in its National Vision 2030 and nurture "an increased regional role economically, politically, and culturally", then it might want to begin viewing the exertion of soft power as something of an ebb and flow. The Arab Spring was a triumph for Qatari foreign policy, but now might be the time for the country to sit back and consolidate its gains.

ZACHARY FILLINGHAM
MANAGING EDITOR OF GEOPOLITICALMONITOR.COM AND A GEOPOLITICAL ANALYST FILLINGHAM HOLDS A BA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM YORK UNIVERSITY IN TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA AND AN MA IN CHINESE STUDIES FROM THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES IN LONDON, ENGLAND.  GEOPOLITICALMONITOR.COM IS AN OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION  AND FORECASTING SERVICE.

EXPERT OPINION

Qatar is a small country in a tough but changing neighbourhood. I suspect that their foreign policy is driven by three key factors. One is to ensure that they have a relationship with all the main players in the region: this is why they seem to hold contradictory policies, for example in hosting the US military but at the same time having a working relationship with Iran, as just one example.

They want all the major actors in the Gulf to have a stake in Qatar's stability and security.

Second, I think foreign policy is seen as linked to economic and trade policy: their foreign policy includes building commercial ties with major economic powers, whether the US, China, the EU, or others, and their encouragement of investment and joint ventures in gas and petrochemicals especially point to this aspect of their strategy. Again, it's a form of security to have major powers hold a stake in the Qatari economy and thus, by extension, in Qatar's security. Finally, I argue in my forthcoming book that foreign relations is also about "branding" the country. They want to send a message that Qatar is dynamic, cosmopolitan, open for business, and willing to contribute to international stability. This is probably why they contributed military forces to the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 - to show that they are good international citizens, sympathetic to regime change, and on the side of democracy (again, overseas rather than at home, even if there is a fairly liberal political climate in Qatar compared with other parts of the Gulf).

Qatar's investments, especially through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), are also linked to foreign policy and economic security. Long-term, I think they hope that the QIA will become a source of income for the state. But in the mean time, the QIA builds Qatar's name abroad, provides an investment link with the same security aims as the joint ventures mentioned above, and is also part of the branding effort. Particular purchases might be profitable in and of themselves - and profit is obviously important- but there's more to the strategy than that, I think. I recall an interview I did in Qatar in 2011, when I asked a journalist about the QIA, and he made the good point that acquisitions such as Harrods or Manchester United, which were being suggested at the time, were a branding master-stroke - a "great way to become a household name". This is why they are hosting the soccer World Cup, and trying to get host of an Olympics, too - they want to become a household name around the world, like Dubai but with different tactics, on their own terms and for their own, unique reasons.

Matthew Gray
Associate Professor, Centre for Arab AND Islamic Studies at Australian National University, Australia.

Qatari foreign policy is very different from the traditional Arab mould of reactive, status quo-oriented diplomacy. It is proactive and risk-taking, which thus far has served Qatar well during the Arab uprisings, but comes with its own risks, especially as the country has increasingly been taking sides in internal conflicts. It is very much personality-driven, hence not always easy to predict, and sometimes seems to be born on the spur of the moment.

Many of Qatar's foreign investments have a diplomatic component and are also designed to serve as political and security links to pivotal Middle Eastern actors like Egypt or important European powers like Britain or France. This strategy so far seems to work, although there can be a trade-off between commercial and diplomatic objectives - the jury on Qatari investments in Greece for example is still out.

STEFFEN HERTOG
SENIOR LECTURER, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, UK

© Qatar Today 2013