04 Sept 2006
According to an exclusive report by Fairplay, the Panama Maritime Authority (AMP) is to make recommendations to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that revisions be made to the ISM Code in particular with respect to the incorporation of drills that recreate real, practical scenarios.
Furthermore, according to the AMP, the type and performance of fixed fire extinguishing systems should also be examined particularly the deluge sprinklers on car decks of ro-ros, to avoid secondary effects of flooding.
The report also recommends that ports must strictly enforce security checks of luggage to avoid loading of hazardous material on ro-ro ferries.
The IMO and other international bodies have also been urged to implement further training in rescue operations for seafarers and authorities on routes involving large numbers of people or pilgrims.
What was very evident from the outset of this ferry disaster was that the human factor played a very significant role, particularly since this vessel was an elderly ro-ro vessel and it was written in these pages (Sea Views, February 13, 2006) that the fact that the ship only had interim ISM certification (as admitted by RINA) could be an indicator that all was not well with the company's safety management system (SMS) and that close scrutiny was required to establish why a ship that was carrying so many passengers should have such certification.
It was also predicted that if deficiencies in the onboard SMS were found to be relevant in this accident, any enquiry would probably uncover uncomfortable truths about implementation and compliance of the ISM Code both onboard the ship and within the company ashore, bearing in mind that the Middle East is a region where the policing of such compliance might not be so stringent as within the EU.
Furthermore, this notion would also apply to the policing of onboard safety standards by Port State Control (PSC) and is likely to reiterate the view that in certain Middle East countries enforcement by PSC amounted to a "joke".
According to the report the cancellations came after Egyptian authorities found serious deficiencies during inspections intended to prevent any reoccurrence of last February's disaster. The identities of the operators involved were not revealed.
Earlier this year ABS issued its Approval in Principle, or AIP, on the SeaOne containment system using the ABS Guidance Notes on Review and Approval of Novel Concepts.
The ABS AIP process draws upon engineering, testing and risk assessments in order to determine if the concept provides acceptable levels of safety in line with current offshore and marine industry practice.
ABS evaluation of the overall system includes an assessment of the cargo containment system and process system to the requirements of ABS Rules, an International Gas Code (IGC) structural strength feasibility study and an analysis of the cargo tank support system.
The SeaOne concept calls for gas to be stored at a modestly elevated pressure with the temperature lower than atmospheric but much warmer than the cryogenic temperature for LNG. The ABS-classed conversions will be the first for CGLCs. The SeaOne CGLC will be designed for worldwide operation.
The writer is a Dubai-based marine consultant.
By Frank Kennedy
Gulf News 2006. All rights reserved.
