09 November 2006

Expert opinion Marco vicenzino

Since the UN-brokered cease-fire on August 14, Lebanon has witnessed a growing public display of post-conflict polarization - as demonstrated by recent clashes between rival factions and the largest public rallies representing diametrically opposing views of the conflict and the nation's future.

On September 22, Hizbullah's leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, defied security concerns to speak to a gathering of 800,000 supporters at a "divine victory" rally.

Two days later, Samir Geagea, leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces and member of the March 14 Forces, held a rally denouncing the conflict as a major reversal for Lebanon and emphasized the need to support the central government and the disarming of all militias.

Convening the rally at an important Christian religious site, the Shrine of the Virgin Mary at Harissa, significantly added symbolism to an already tense and divisive state of affairs. While the domestic and international debate concerning the multinational UN presence continues, the force's full impact is not yet felt as troops continue to arrive gradually.

Although opposing views were expressed by some during the 34-day conflict, Geagea's speech was by far the most comprehensive, outspoken and defiant speech against Hizbullah since the cease-fire from any major figure across the political spectrum. In essence, Geagea's speech may have marked the throwing down of the gauntlet in the intensifying war of words.

Many former enemies of the 1975-90 Civil War, such as Geagea and Walid Jumblatt, have found a common home in the March 14 coalition. Some of the underlying factors uniting the parties include opposition to Syrian influence in Lebanon and agreement on a common vision of a secular Lebanon rooted in democratic institutions. But there is no single charismatic individual able to coalesce these often disparate forces and the movement's structural foundations remain fairly weak. This allows Hizbullah, under Nasrallah's firm and unchallenged leadership in the Shiite community, to easily exploit the differences of other sects to its advantage.

United under the guidance of the wily Jumblatt, the Druze represent a dwindling minority whose numbers most likely constitute far less than 10 percent of the population. Although losing supremacy in the Shiite community to Hizbullah, Speaker Nabih Berri has skillfully reinvented himself over the years to emerge as the indispensable mediator between Hizbullah and all its internal and external opposition.

The Sunni community largely looks to the Hariri faction for leadership, which is currently affiliated with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's central government, which survived the conflict but is currently being challenged by enormous post-conflict pressures. Although the premier has demonstrated a level of resilience defying the expectations of many skeptics, it remains uncertain for how long his government will survive.

Siniora came into office lacking the international stature, standing, charisma and force of personality of slain former Premier Rafik Hariri, whose success was largely based on his interpersonal skills, particularly an acute understanding of the needs of others and a remarkable ability to deliver which created an aura of indispensability about him. This facilitated the creation of an international network of contacts and friendships accumulated over a lifetime in the private sector which played an enormous role in political dealings internationally as premier.

Since its creation, the Siniora government has struggled to achieve a broad consensus to advance the national agenda, which clearly reflects the divisive and fractious state of affairs of current Lebanese politics.

The Christian community, once Lebanon's largest and most influential power-brokers, remains the country's most divided sect, with no single prominent leader. Its pre-1975 status of privilege and pre-eminence is long gone. Its dwindling numbers are largely attributable to lower birth rates and massive emigration over the past century, with more Lebanese Christians (including their offspring) residing overseas than in Lebanon.

Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir arguably remains the only figure who can speak with any moral authority on behalf of Lebanon's Maronites, but perhaps not the Greek Orthodox community. The patriarch's opinion and counsel are widely sought in the international arena, as evidenced by regular meetings with high-ranking international figures, particularly US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Although politically influential, the patriarch remains a religious figure, which ultimately provides no substitute for a prominent secular leader needed to represent the community at the national level, particularly in the current state of polarization and when a new Maronite president will be chosen in 2007. The patriarch's blessing and approval remain an important custom.

The only two secular Christian figures who continue to exert influence remain the Civil- War-time leaders Geagea and Michel Aoun. In the last stage of the 1975-90 Civil War, they led an intra-sectarian, fratricidal conflict between Christians which ultimately culminated in a final defeat for the entire Christian community and the loss of its influence. The Taif Accord ending the Civil War ultimately consolidated this defeat. Aoun fled to exile in France and Geagea was eventually imprisoned for 11 years in solitary confinement on charges stemming from the war. In the autumn of 2005, Geagea was pardoned by the Lebanese Parliament, but Hizbullah's MPs abstained from the vote.

Since his release, Geagea has been recovering and reorganizing his political base, which remained fiercely loyal during his absence. Although Geagea has made several public appearances over the past year, his September 24 speech may mark a more prominent, full-scale return to the political scene and a growing presence within the March 14 Forces.

Geagea arguably enjoys only 15-20 percent support within the Christian community, but it remains a well-organized and staunchly devoted minority, particularly in the traditional Maronite strongholds in the mountains of North Lebanon.

Aoun is the only other major figure with significant support in the Christian community and one of the few figures who can claim some support from across the sectarian spectrum. This is mostly due to his strong military and nationalist credentials and reputation among his supporters for incorruptibility. However, his base of support is ultimately dependent and rooted in the Christian community for which numbers range from 25 to 40 percent (although the numbers are not fully clear).

Aoun returned to Lebanon in May 2005 after some 15 years of exile in France. Within a month of his return, he led an impressive electoral performance in the June 2005 parliamentary polls, despite the obstacles of Syrian-gerrymandered voting districts designed to prevent significant Christian electoral gains.

However, the high expectations and hopes that accompanied Aoun's return have yet to materialize over a year later. The general has yet to capture the wider public imagination beyond his core constituency. The reasons are the subject of fierce debate littered by charges and countercharges, particularly concerning his relationship with the March 14 Forces and specifically with the Hariri faction.

Aoun's supporters claim that the March 14 leaders attempted to sideline him from the very beginning - that is, immediately after the Syrian departure - by insisting he not return to Lebanon until after the elections. The bickering that ensued in the following months ultimately led to Aoun's memorandum of understanding with Hizbullah in February 2006, which from some quarters drew charges of treason and having "sold out" to the Syrians.

Aoun's relationship with Hizbullah may represent a long-term strategic calculation and tactical move based on the reality that Lebanon's Shiites will inevitably become the majority and the Christians will diminish in numbers. Consequently, it would be best to build a relationship now and lock them into the current institutions of secular democracy, from which it would be more difficult to disengage in the future.

Aoun's supporters charge that a government-controlled media has further complicated his situation. Furthermore, Aoun's insistence on a public audit of all government officials has further complicated relations with the central government.

Aoun's critics note that his authoritarian style and tendencies make collaboration and cooperation nearly impossible. He never intended to become part of the March 14 Forces and sought pretexts for a rift to emerge. He ultimately remains a military man in civilian clothing whose only obsession is becoming president of Lebanon.

Aoun's critics say Aounism is about Aoun himself and that eventually with his death there will be no credible successor to his movement. His current age and health serve as liabilities to his political aspirations.

Aoun's political organization, the Free Patriotic Movement, officially became a political party in the autumn of 2005. The party's vision and political platform call for a secular, democratic Lebanon and the fight against corruption remains a core theme. The organization has significant support from many young committed idealists, many of whom protested regularly and were subject to repression by the Syrian and Lebanese security apparatus from 1990 to 2005.

The higher level of the party hierarchy is composed of long-time, senior Aoun loyalists and the grass-roots machinery is staffed largely by supporters in their 20s and 30s. However, the party lacks a group of seasoned mid-career professionals and senior technocrats (in their 40s and 50s) that can bridge the gap and convert the party into a fully effective political entity.

Ultimately, Aoun's main challenges are internally driven. His sporadic public outbursts and sensationalist statements contribute to an image of instability (particularly when statements are interpreted literally), diminish his credibility and a loss of important political capital. There is also the lack of a formidable strategic communications team able to deliver a coherent message. Despite the party's tech-savvy Web site, the oral message from the leader and principal spokesman is not connecting effectively. All this combined has facilitated the task of Aoun's opponents, particularly those in the media.

Marco Vicenzino is the founder and executive director of the Global Strategy Project. He served as deputy executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US (IISS-US) in Washington, DC, and is an international attorney. He is a graduate of Oxford University and Georgetown University Law Center and has taught International Law at the School of International Service of American University. He can be contacted at msv@globalsp.org.