Egypt's Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) has faced tremendous criticism from virtually all quarters as it pursues a policy that appears to be contrary to the aspirations of the revolution.
After Hosni Mubarak's forced departure from the political scene, SCAF has been seen by many as the immovable object that has obstructed the spontaneous protests of last year.
Cynics believe the army sided with protestors early on in the revolution as it feared Mr. Mubarak's dynastic designs and machninations would mean his son (and then probably his son and so forth) would take over the presidency, following the North Korean model.
For the army, being on the sidelines of the revolution was more about self-preservation rather than a great desire to see the lot of Egyptians liberated from poverty and basic social and economic justice.
But now it appears to fear everyone else.
"Virtually all political parties are regarded [by the army] with scorn, self-centred in their demands, narrow-minded in their behaviour," said The International Crisis Group in a note.
"Its goal, from the outset, was to preserve what it could from the previous system for the sake of continuity, restore normalcy, marginalise a protest movement it viewed with considerable suspicion as well as both work with and contain the Islamists," the Group wrote.
Not only are the odds for the army's success declining by the day; in the process, it is increasingly alienating a range of political forces while diminishing its leverage and capacity to pursue its goals, the group notes.
The presidential election process, which has seen some of the most well-known candidates banned from running, has further thrown the process in disarray. The final list of 13 candidates for the presidency excludes a number of luminaries, such as former vice-president Omar Suleiman, Muslim Brotherhood's Khairat El-Shater and Salafist Hazem Abu Ismail. That leaves moderate Amr Moussa, Islamic moderate Abdel Moneum Aboul Fotouh, Hamdeen Sabahi, Ahmed Shafiq and Mohamed Mursi as front-runners to compete in the May 23-24 election, with a runoff scheduled in June.
The election may well be the SCAF's 'last chance' to produce a 'balanced' political system in a peacful manner, acknowledging the ascendanacy of Islamic parties, notes the Crisis Group.
As protracted loan discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continue, the army also has to contend with the ire of powerful regional allies such as Saudi Arabia, which recalled its ambassador on Saturday and shut its embassy after Egyptians reportedly threatened its employees in Cairo.
While Saudi Arabia is unlikely to cut off ties and renege on promised financial aid of billions of dollars, it creates yet another headache for SCAF as it walks the political tight-rope.
Saudi Arabia is just the latest episode in a long line of issues. SCAF has to battle threats not only within but also across its border. The decision to cut Israeli gas supplies (more of that later) has opened a fresh avenue of uncertainty, even as Egypt wearily watches its borders for further polticial uncertainty in Sudan and Libya. No wonder the defensive-instincts of the army have come to the fore at the time of great upheaval.
The army certainly has no wish to remain in the political spotlight, governing the nation and thus blamed for what inevitably will be a taxing period of social and economic distress, says the ICG.
"But nor does it intend to be sidelined, lose its self-ascribed role as guarantor of constitutional legitimacy, be stripped of its economic privileges or see political institutions in the hands of a single (Islamist) party. Its objective is to stay in the background yet remain an arbitrator; and shun the limelight even as it retains decisive influence."
EL-BARADEI'S PARTY
What's lost in the power struggle and the political circus is the Egyptian people's basic needs.
Not surprisingly, the country's democratic process is lurching from one crisis to another. The youthful face of the revolution has been replaced by old men in uniform and parties with recycled ideas and incredulous distractions, such as rights over dead spouses.
Alon Ben-Meir, a senior fellow at New York University's Centre for Global Affairs, says that Egyptian youth and secularists seize the initiative and unite under Nobel laureate Mohamed El-Baradei's Al-Tahwra party.
"In preparation for this ambitious political unity, the Egyptian youth should organize itself and mobilize the masses (as they did in the initial stages of the revolution) to take to the streets in the millions in support of a single motto: save the revolution," said Mr. Ben-Meir.
The professor suggests four key focus areas for the secular and youth movement:
Constitutional assembly be representative of the entire Egyptian political spectrum, and not dictated by the parliament, even though it is democratically elected (i.e., this should not be the dictatorship of the majority -- to ensure the civil nature of the state).
For the elections to be fair, the SCAF and the government should enforce the articles of the current constitutional declaration that forbid the use of religious references in electoral campaigns. Ironically, the MB presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsy, has explicitly stated that he is running under the maxim of: Islam is the Solution.
An immediate restructuring and overhaul of the Ministry of Interior and its intelligence branch, the "National Security Service", to ensure their full compliance with human rights while focusing on serious national security threats and not democracy-promotion, NGOs and youth movements as they have in the recent past.
Finally, full respect of the transitional period timeline, ending on June 30, 2012, that would ensure the world's confidence in the path Egypt is taking and restore foreign investments.
The last point is underscored by Egypt's decision to cut off natural gas supplies to Israel, purportedly on 'commercial grounds' because Tel Aviv missed payment deadlines.
While the decision appeases many political parties and the masses, it comes at a time when Egypt needs to put its finances in order. Gas supplies to Israel is 14% of the country's natural gas exports, but the decision was taken perhaps because it hurts Israel more - Egypt supplies 43% of Israel's gas consumption.
To be sure, the Egyptian government's decision to export gas to Israel was never popular and that was clearly evident as the pipeline in Sinai has been bombed 14 times.
Critics also argue that the Israeli gas deal was disadvantageous for Egypt as it fetched a price of USD2.7 per million British thermal units, much lower than the USD5 -10 per mBtu available in international markets.
"Egypt could redirect its natural gas resources formerly exported to Israel toward meeting its own rising energy demand and saving itself the higher cost paid for petroleum products, which put ongoing pressure on the state's budget," says Mona Mansoor, an analyst with Capital Research.
"However, such savings would only be achieved in the longer term, as setting up the required infrastructure for the natural gas distribution network takes time. It is worth highlighting that Egypt's Ministry of Electricity announced that the natural gas that used to be exported to Israel could be directed to Egyptian electricity plants."
SCAF''S ECONOMIC INTERESTS
It is important to understand that SCAF also has significant economic interests and will be keen to ensure Egypt remains an attractive investment decision.
"Estimates of its stake in the economy vary wildly, from 10% to a somewhat implausible 40%," noted Jane Kinninmont, an analyst at Chatham House. "However, the strength of its resources was illustrated in December 2011 when it agreed to lend USD1-billion to the Central Bank of Egypt to help support the value of the currency at a time when the central bank's foreign-exchange reserves were dwindling."
The various military organizations reportedly own 35 factories that focus on defence equipment, vehicles, cement and other retail and foodstuff.
"Brands ranging from Wataniya petrol stations to Queen pasta appeared on lists of military-owned products that circulated in Egypt in 2011. The military is also thought to have extensive real estate holdings," says Ms. Kinninmont.
The army, therefore has a vested interest in ensuring real estate and tourism remain strong sectors.
But while it is keen to keep the economy stable, "it is unlikely to look favourably on economic liberalization where it might lead to greater competition with its own business interests."
It also appears to be at odds with labour unions and NGOs that seek greater transparency and more public participation in economic and social decision-making.
"The military is also believed to be highly suspicious of foreign debt as a possible threat to sovereignty, and is likely to have been the main source of objections to the proposed IMF loan in 2011," said Ms. Kinninmont.
Fortunately for Egyptians, the army does not have complete control of the situation. For all its might, SCAF has been unable to contain protests and the rise of the Islamic parties. Similarly, the Islamic parites, for all their parliamentary gains, have to contend with the army and popular opinion which is often at odds with its own world view. Finally, the secular movement is regrouping after setbacks in parliament, and may eventually emerge as a forceful group under Mr. Baradei.
"It is not too late," the ICG notes. "What is urgently needed is what the SCAF was either unwilling or unable to do from the outset: consult broadly and seriously with representatives from the entire political class and reach agreement on key parameters of a future political system - the powers of the presidency, the constitutional committee's make-up and the basis of civil-military relations."
Despite the upheavels and the often grim prognosis from analysts, nothing is yet lost in Egypt, and there is still much to gain.
© alifarabia.com 2012
