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Silence speaks volumes

By James Gavin February 2012

Syria's descent into civil war is not just a challenge for the leadership of president Bashar al Assad. It also threatens to spill over into its two most prominent Arab neighbours, Iraq and Lebanon
Both Beirut and Baghdad - who both share a fragile sectarian balance that could be upset in the event of the overthrow of the Syrian regime or a prolonged military conflict - have generally held their counsel on the Syrian president's crackdown, maintaining a diplomatic silence that is sharply at odds with the Arab League's rising anger at the Baathist regime in Damascus.

The official stance of both governments also disguises deep rifts within their own countries over how to handle Syria; Iraq's significant Sunni Arab population has expressed unease at prime minister Nouri al Maliki's robust support for president Assad, seen by critics as a by-product of the extensive Iranian influence over Iraq's Shia-dominated government. Tehran is wary of seeing its key strategic Arab partner taken out of its orbit.

In Lebanon, the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance has similarly signalled its distaste over the broadly pro-Syrian, March 8th-dominated cabinet's failure to condemn the Assad regime's assault on anti-regime protestors. Many of Lebanon's Sunni and Christian communities are actively siding with the Syrian opposition; in Lebanon's north, this extends to providing shelter for refugees from the conflict, and support for the Free Syrian Army in Sunni-dominated areas like Tripoli.

The latter city's increasing sectarian tensions represents in microcosm the dispute next door, with the minority Alawite area of Jebel Mohsen coming under siege from a hostile Sunni population that is fiercely opposed to the Assad regime.

The key danger is that these micro-level conflicts could burst out across the country if a resolution to the conflict isn't found soon.

One Beirut political analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity, says the looming shadow of Sunni-Shia confrontation is precipitating low-intensity preparations which, though they have not yet resulted in large scale skirmishes, could eventually. "There is an undercurrent of tension that is bound to surface if and when regime in Syria is changed," says the analyst, pointing to Sunni/Shia standoffs in areas like Beirut's Tareq al Jdeideh seen on repeated occasions over the past five years.

Lebanon is already experiencing the economic side effects of the prolonged conflict in Syria. In mid-January, HSBC Bank revised downwards its 2012 real GDP growth forecast for Lebanon to 2.3 per cent, compared to a previous forecast of 3.2 per cent. Lebanon's projected growth rate for 2012 would make it the slowest economy in the region, says the bank, anticipating that uncertainty over the risks emanating from Syria (along with Iran and Israel) will weigh on investor perceptions of Lebanon in 2012, and add to an already difficult economic climate.

Local observers confirm that the Syrian conflict's impact is being felt in its broader impact on Lebanese investor sentiment. "No-one's making investment decisions right now. That's where the impact has hit most strongly," says Nassib Ghobril, head of research at Beirut-based Byblos Bank.

Tourist numbers are another early casualty of Syria's ructions. Lebanon relies on a heavy road-borne inflow of Gulf visitors during the summer months, a large proportion of whom drive to the country via Syria. That flow was reduced to a trickle last summer, with overall numbers declining 24 per cent to 1.66 million over the full year. "The Gulf visitors just aren't getting through to Syria," notes another Beirut-based economist.

On the other hand, Lebanon could also benefit - at least in the short-to-medium term - from its strategic location next door to Syria. Syrian private sector importers are already mulling whether to locate themselves in Lebanon in order to obtain letters of credit from Lebanese banks, thereby skirting punitive economic measures imposed on Syria. The Bekaa town of Chtoura, just a few kilometers from the Syrian border, could also benefit by servicing Syria's embattled private sector - a role it carried out with aplomb until president Assad introduced economic reforms in 2004 that facilitated the establishment of a modern commercial banking system in Syria.

Iraq's close trade ties with Syria are also a source of complication in its attitude towards Damascus. Iraq imports significant volumes of foodstuffs from Syria and will have noted Damascus' decision to impose a punitive 30 per cent tariff on Turkish imports into Syria in response to Ankara's strong condemnation of the Assad regime.

Trade volumes between the two countries are substantial. Almost one-third of Syria's exports to the Arab world end up in Iraq. Syria exported $5 billion-worth of exports to Iraq in 2010, importing $803 million-worth of Iraqi exports. Only Turkey exports more to Iraq.

Iraq's critical trade relationship with Syria has provided convenient cover for its government's neutral stance towards the Assad regime. "Trade relations between Syria and Iraq do not allow Iraq to implement the decisions of the Arab League," Iraq's representative to the Arab League, Qais al Azzawi, told the Al Sabah newspaper last November.

Iraqi leaders have called for open dialogue between the opposition and the regime, but have strongly rejected the idea of "foreign interference" in Iraq. They have abstained from a vote to suspend Syria from the Arab League and another imposing sanctions on Damascus.

As well as feeling pressure on its collar from its close ally Iran not to destabilise Syria's regime, Iraq's leadership has its own reason for wanting the current Syrian leadership to remain in power.

The Shia-led government in Baghdad still views the conflict in its neighbour through the prism of sectarianism, and fears that the Sunni-dominated opposition to the Baathist leadership in Syria could foment trouble in its own backyard, with Sunni-dominated provinces like Anbar seen as potential platforms for anti-government resistance inside Iraq.

This concern is particularly acute in light of the worsening political climate in Iraq this year, following the arrest warrant issued by Maliki on the Sunni vice president, Tareq al Hashemi, currently under the protection of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq's north. The main Sunni-supported political party in Iraq, the Iraqiya movement, is boycotting the political process in protest at what it sees as a sectarian witch-hunt being conducted by the prime minister.

The fear of the unknown is not confined to the Shia leadership. Even Iraq's Kurdish political elites appear unenthusiastic about the prospect of regime change in Damascus. Last November, Iraq's president Jalal Talabani - a Kurd - warned in a TV interview that extremists were poised to take over if Assad fell. "We are afraid that if extremist forces come to power, they would be hostile to democracy, and hostile to Iraq," he said.

Iraq's Kurds are another group with divided loyalties towards Syria, which is also reflected in the Syrian Kurds' position that neither supports Assad nor the opposition Syrian National Council. Early in the uprising, president Assad attempted to curry favour with the estimated two million strong Kurdish minority in the country's northeast by finally granting them full citizenship rights.

The KRG - currently at loggerheads with Maliki over its harbouring of the fugitive vice president Hashemi - has not joined in the wider region's chorus of disapproval of Assad.

"The Syria situation is complicated," Falah Mustafa Bakir, the KRG head of foreign relations told a meeting in London on 17 January. "You can't say that the regime will fall in one or two months. In two major provinces, Damascus and Aleppo, there haven't been any serious demonstrations that would threaten the security of the regime."

So long as close trade relations and a complicated interconnection of political and sectarian interests keep Iraq and Lebanon on side with Damascus, these two key neighbours are primed a significant role in sustaining the Assad regime in power.

However, neither Lebanon nor Iraq can give unconditional support to the Assad regime. And if the balance of forces in Syria changes, weakening Assad's hold on power, neither country will be in a position to prop him up.

© The Gulf 2012