Politics was once a dirty word in the United Arab Emirates. Unlike other Gulf states that have long boasted lively political cultures Kuwait and Bahrain in particular in the Emirates people tended to get on with the business of making money rather than troubling themselves with arcane policy debates.
No longer. Not only is the UAE becoming more politically engaged at the grassroots level, with the emergence of organised Islamist factions, the government in Abu Dhabi has started to articulate a more dynamic domestic and foreign policy.
In doing so it has courted controversy. Early March saw the start of a trial of 94 Islamists in Abu Dhabi, the clearest indicator of the shifting political mood in the country. The court proceedings against the Emirati Islamists is the culmination of a vigorous crackdown on the Jamiat al Islah wa Tawjih Islah for short which has been linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
At the instigation of Abu Dhabis crown prince Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the federal government has taken an unprecedented hard-line approach to elements considered threats to the status quo.
High up on the charge sheet against Islah are allegations that it had built a secret organisational structure aiming to turn public opinion against the state. It had also, the authorities allege, communicated with international and foreign entities to distort the states image.
In the view of the Abu Dhabi leadership, Islah which traces its roots to the early 1970s in Dubai has transformed from a social movement into a willing tool of Egypts Muslim Brotherhood. They fear that Cairos chapter of the Ikhwan is a force for instability, and appear determined to nip it in the bud.
Abu Dhabis stance is not just a belated reaction to the Arab Spring; analysts point out that the pressure on Islamists is also a reflection of a changed dynamic within the federation since Dubais debt crisis of 2009-2010.
According to analyst Jim Krane, author of Dubai: The Story of the Worlds Fastest City, the clipping of Dubais wings, after Abu Dhabi was forced to bail out the debt-racked emirate, has radically shifted intra-emirate relationships.
You now have this changing dynamic. When Dubais star was rising you didnt see this focus on Islamism or much of a desire to get involved in regional politics. Dubai has always maintained that it only wanted to develop commercial relations and that it wasnt so interested in politics.
The robust approach to internal criticism has repercussions for the UAEs relations with the wider Arab world. Perhaps more significantly, Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayeds hard-line stance ruffled feathers with long-standing allies like the UK and Egypt.
The unravelling in UAE-Egyptian relations has been pronounced since the Muslim Brotherhoods Mohammed Mursi swept to power in presidential elections in Egypt last year.
The arrest in Abu Dhabi last November of 11 Egyptians, accused of establishing an Ikhwan cell and plotting to overthrow the government, represented a new low in bilateral ties.
Senior UAE officials have not been afraid to weigh in with public criticism of Mursis embattled administration. Dubai police chief, lieutenant general Dahi Khalfan Tamim, has pumped out virulent anti-Egyptian messages into the Twittersphere, accusing the Egyptian Brotherhood of being unfit to manage a grocery store, in one of his more memorable tweets.
President Mursi is an obvious target for Abu Dhabis anger, given the Brotherhoods role in overthrowing Mubarak, a staunch ally of the Gulf states.
The frosty UAE reaction to Mursis victory has had negative impacts on Egypts struggling economy, with the reported delay of $3 billion in UAE aid pledged to Egypt.
Less anticipated has been the UAEs decision to put its relationship with Britain under the spotlight. In the summer, the UK oil supermajor BP found itself unexpectedly removed from a list of companies bidding to renew their participation on a long-standing oil concession in Abu Dhabi seen as a sign of the emirates displeasure at Londons failure to take a tougher stance against UK-resident Islamists.
UK prime minister David Camerons speedy dispatch to the Gulf in early November 2012, where he held high level talks with officials in Abu Dhabi, looks to have contained the rupture, and BP is said once again to be in the running for the oil concession.
Even so, the Abu Dhabis leaderships willingness to risk long-standing ties with a prominent western ally shows just how challenging the political climate in the Gulf has become.
The froideur at Britain is shared with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia. However, there are nuances to UAE foreign policy that mark it out from other Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states. Unlike Qatar, which has taken a tough stance towards Syria, the Abu Dhabi leadership has preferred a lower key method of exerting pressure on the regime of president Bashar al Assad.
Rather than play a role in funneling arms and cash to the Free Syrian Army rebels, as both Riyadh and Doha have done, Abu Dhabi has focused on economic support to the opposition. For example, in May last year, Abu Dhabi played host to a meeting of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syria.
Perhaps wary that the overthrow of Assad could lead to another Muslim Brotherhood-dominated regime, senior policy makers have stressed the need for a non-sectarian change of power in Damascus. Indeed, Bashar al Assads sister Bushra widow of the assassinated Syrian security chief Assef Shawkat is currently living in Dubai with her family. This would be difficult to imagine happening in Riyadh or Doha.
However, Syrias close ally Iran remains an arch enemy of the Abu Dhabi leadership, and with the balance of power within the federation shifting away from Dubai which enjoys long-standing trade links with the Islamic republic foreign policy towards Tehran is likely to harden. Abu Dhabi continues to raise the Iranian occupation of the three Gulf islands, Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, demanding the restoration of the UAEs full sovereignty over them.
Abu Dhabi has more of a political axe to grind with the revolutionary regime in Tehran. Washington finds it a much easier sell to get Abu Dhabi on board with its policy than it does the merchants in Dubai, so theyve got divided interests, says Krane.
The refashioning of the UAEs policy focus will invariably lead the seven-emirate federation into areas that its founder, Shaikh Zayed, would never have ventured into.
And though the robust line adopted towards Islamist groups has attracted unprecedented criticism internationally, senior leadership figures are unlikely to rein back their new-found policy activities.
