Benchmarking The Remuneration Fees For Iraqi Oil Fields

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant and scholar. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya@online.no).

Introduction

The mystifying avalanche of remuneration fees long held by international oil companies (IOCs) began when one of the consortiums participating in Iraq’s first bid round, Lukoil/ConocoPhillips, expressed a readiness to make a remarkable move by agreeing to slash its remuneration fees to an astonishing one-third of its original offer. Soon after the announcement, it appears that other IOCs have in fact made or are making similar cuts in their respective remuneration fees particularly for the two prized oilfields: West Qurna 1 and Zubair. News coming from Baghdad indicates that a consortium of Eni, Occidental (Oxy) and Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas) has won the Zubair oilfield, and an announcement on West Qurna 1 is imminent.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on these remarkable developments, and attempt to understand and explore their causes, consequences and implications for all involved in and concerned with Iraq’s petroleum upstream sub-sector. Since the bid for the Zubair oilfield seems to have been closed for the Eni-lead consortium, I will examine the impact of this development and explore the options for West Qurna 1.

First Bid Refreshment On The Zubair And West Qurna 1 Oil Fields

The conclusion of the Zubair deal would mean that the Eni-led consortium had reduced its remuneration fee per additional produced barrel (RF/B) from $4.80/B to $2.00/B (representing a reduction of 58.3%, though in the June bid event they reduced their RF from $4.80/B to $4.40/B), and with its plateau production target (PPT) of 1,125,000 b/d, it would have 930,000 b/d of additional capacity over the initial production rate (IPR) of 195,000 b/d as stated by the Ministry of Oil.

The other significant development is the exclusion of the Chinese firm Sinopec from this consortium. This indicates that Baghdad means business and its deeds match its words regarding IOCs’ involvement with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) contracts. This could have further implications in consolidating Baghdad’s position on these contracts.

The expulsion of Sinopec has also implications on the participation interests within the consortium. For June bidding the participation interests were Eni 35%, Sinopec 20%, Oxy 25% and Kogas 20%. It remains to be seen how the 20% share of Sinopec is distributed among the remaining three partners, or whether a fourth partner will join instead. This could have consequences on the cost structure of the consortium and thus might have contributed to the reduced RF.

Incidentally, nothing surfaced regarding the Zubair oilfield bid of CNPC/BP (66.67: 33.33), which appeared the most likely candidate considering its initial RF of $4.09/B and its (slightly low) PPT of 1,075,000 b/d. Does the absence, so far, of CNPC/BP from the race for this oilfield indicate an Iraqi risk exposure limitation or capacity constraint for both IOCs, BP and CNPC?

While the Zubair oilfield deal appears to have been done, the situation with West Qurna 1 seems not to be concluded yet. During the first bid round held on 30 June, West Qurna 1 oilfield received five competitive bids from IOCs based on the two bidding parameters, remuneration fee per additional produced barrel (RF/B) and plateau production target (PPT) as summarized below:

Information from the Ministry of Oil on West Qurna 1 oil field shows an IPR of 258,500 b/d. The minimum PPT envisaged by the ministry is 600,000 b/d and the ministry is willing to offer an RF of $1.90/B for additional production over and above the IPR.

Since none of the above five competing IOCs/consortiums had come with an RF bid equal to what the ministry had offered, the ministry asked the IOCs to reconsider their position and submit new RFs. At that time only two of them did so: ExxonMobil/Shell reduced its RF by $0.30/B to $3.70/B and CNPC/Petronas/Japex reduced its RF by only $0.02/B to $2.58/B. ¹

After almost 100 days, and in a surprise move, Lukoil boss Vagit Alekperov reportedly said “the consortium of Lukoil and ConocoPhillips is ready to enter into direct talks concerning the West Qurna 1 project on the terms that were announced earlier by Iraq’s oil ministry.” ²   No confirmation or denial from ConocoPhillips had surfaced so far. It is assumed, therefore, that Mr Alekperov speaks on behalf of the two partners in the consortium. However, the domino effect of this announcement is still in motion.

Ministry Of Oil Options

In an earlier contribution published in MEES, I suggested three options for the Ministry of Oil to deal with the oilfields offered under the first bid round. As ‘option two’ I suggested that the ministry could request the same competing consortiums for West Qurna and Zubair to reconsider their bidding parameters by accepting the ministry’s RF and competing on the PPT (with the duration of the plateau period as a new bidding parameter). ³

By accepting the “terms that were announced earlier by Iraq’s oil ministry”, Lukoil/ ConocoPhillips has done what was suggested above and thus reduced its RF from $6.49/B to $1.90/B, a significant reduction of $4.59/B.

It appears also that the ministry had entertained option two and asked the remaining IOCs and their consortiums to revise their positions, keeping in mind the Lukoil/ ConocoPhillips offer as the new baseline. This baseline automatically disqualifies both Total and Repsol/ StatoilHydro/ Maersk from the race on the grounds of their respective comparably low PPTs, in addition to their high RFs, and the remaining two consortiums – ExxonMobil/Shell (all-western) and CNCP/Petronas/Japex (all-Asian) would compete with each other and with baseline holder Lukoil/ConocoPhillips.

There are four possible outcomes if the Ministry of Oil decides to go this ‘extra mile’:

• The remaining two consortiums agree to reduce their RF to $1.90/B and retain their respective PPT. In this case ExxonMobil/Shell becomes the favorite since this consortium offers the highest PPT. The question remains as to how is it possible that the consortium would be able to make the required reduction from $3.70/B to $1.90/B. One possibility could be the utilization of Shell’s presence in southern Iraq if and when the deal regarding the gas joint venture comes into fruition. This joint venture could provide invaluable “cost-related-externalities” that could contribute to reduce the cost of West Qurna 1 oil field. This eventuality could face three daunting hurdles. First the gas joint venture with Shell is far from final. It has encountered serious hurdles and the deadline (22 September 2009) was extended for another six months accordingly. Opposition to this deal from parliamentarians and oil professional remains high. ⁴   The second is that the ExxonMobil/Shell consortium is politically sensitive since both are remnants of the old ‘seven sisters’, and thus would be projected by Iraqis as agents of imperial powers who are coming back to control the national wealth. Finally, if West Qurna 1 was awarded to ExxonMobil/Shell and the gas joint venture with Shell was finalized, then these two IOCs could acquire a powerful position in the country’s petroleum sector, which could have serious national security implications. These considerations could work against offering this field to ExxonMobil/Shell.   

• The remaining two consortiums decline to reduce their RF to $1.90/B and retain their respective PPT. In this case Lukoil/ConocoPhillips becomes the favorite. However, since the Minister of Oil has confirmed in his press conference on 13 October 2009 (as reported on Iraqia TV ) that at least ExxonMobil/Shell has accepted to reduce their RF, then this option is not valid any more.  

• The remaining two consortiums agree to reduce their RF to $1.90/B but reduce their respective PPT to a level higher than that of Lukoil/ConocoPhillips. Actually this possibility was suggested by the Minister of Oil as an explanation of how the IOCs went for a high PPT and thus came up with a high RF. Reducing their PPT could, by implication, lead to reduced RF. (The companies went wrong, in his view, by setting overly ambitious output targets that inflated payment expectations for the producing fields in the first round).⁵   In this case the consortium with the highest PPT becomes the favorite provided that the new PPT is “reasonably higher” than that proposed by Lukoil/ConocoPhillips. According to the minister’s press conference, ExxonMobil/Shell will reduce its PPT from 2,325,000 b/d to 2,100,000 b/d.⁶   Hence, ExxonMobil/Shell could become favorites, and thus we are back to outcome one above.  

• The remaining two consortiums agree to reduce their RF to $1.90/B but reduce their respective PPT to that of Lukoil/ConocoPhillips, at 1,500,000 bd. The same argument made regarding to point three above applies. Theoretically, though, if this scenario materializes then the ministry could use additional bidding parameters for the three consortiums to compete on. 

We should take note again of the absence, so far, of the ‘all-Asians’ consortium, and wonder if they would come with a last minute surprise?

Moreover, the above analysis would give more chance and probability to Exxon/Shell over Lukoil/ ConocoPhillips. The question then is why the latter made this move in this particular time? Has this any thing to do with West Qurna 2 oilfield, which is destined for bid round two?

It is worth studying some background on this matter. Lukoil is the largest Russian private oil company. In terms of total production the company was ranked number 11 in 2005 on a worldwide scale.⁷   Like all other Russian fully or partially state owned and private sector oil companies, Lukoil enjoys financial and political support from the state. Russia, like other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, assigns strategic importance to having access to petroleum resources worldwide, and thus grants its companies additional support to attain such objectives of high interest to national and security. Furthermore, Iraq occupies special importance in Russian geopolitical strategic thinking: “Russian oil companies were encouraged and directed by their government, as a matter of state policy, to invest in Iraq.”⁸  

In terms of ownership, 20 % of Lukoil is owned by ConocoPhillips and the remaining 80% is Russian. This means that the Lukoil/ConocoPhillips business relationship is much more than a consortium oriented to bid for the West Qurna 1 oil field. Moreover, this has significant meaning for ConocoPhillips if and when Lukoil succeeds in acquiring lucrative business opportunities in Iraq’s petroleum upstream.

Lukoil has or could have a wealth of important information and data on the Iraqi petroleum upstream sector from the era of the former Soviet Union, when both countries enjoyed a decade of close economic and technical cooperation in the aftermath of oil nationalization in Iraq in the early 1970s. During the 1908s, Lukoil signed a series of construction, engineering and drilling contracts for West Qurna 1, each on a turnkey lump-sum basis.

In 1996-97, Lukoil won the rights to develop West Qurna 2 field and signed a 23-year contract giving it a 68.5% equity interest, with two other Russian oil companies, Zarubezhneft and Machinoimport, acquiring 3.25% each. That agreement was repealed by Iraq in December 2003, but the top political level meetings that took place in Moscow (between Primer Ministers Nuri al-Maliki and Vladimir Putin) and Baghdad in 2009 had revived Lukoil’s hope for West Qurna 2 oilfields, with the company expressing its readiness “to adopt a contract to Iraq’s new legislation.” ⁹   

The question now is whether this move by Lukoil/ConocoPhillips has any thing to do with a deal regarding West Qurna 2, bearing in mind again that this oilfield is listed among the fields for the second bid round?  

Considering the above four outcomes, the possible effects in terms of additional plateau capacity over the initial production rate, which is the prevailing production rate at the time of the bid round, could range from a minimum of 1,242,500 b/d if Lukoil/ConocoPhillips wins the bid, to a maximum of 1,841,500 b/d if ExxonMobil/Shell wins it.

When we add in the increment capacity envisaged for the Rumaila oilfield under the BP/CNPC deal (PPT 2,850,000 b/d and IPR 956,000 b/d, which was the prevailing production rate at the time of the bid round and not necessarily the baseline production adopted at the signing of the contract) and Zubair oilfield under the Eni-led consortium (PPT 1,125,000 b/d and IPR 195,000 b/d) to West Qurna 1 as discussed above, then the additional plateau capacity from these three oilfields alone could range from a minimum of 4,065,500 b/d to a maximum of 4,705,500 b/d. The corresponding total plateau production capacity from these three oilfields could range from a minimum of 5,475,000 b/d to a maximum 6,075,000 b/d. And since the pendulum tilts towards ExxonMobil/Shell more than Lukoil/ConocoPhillips, then the additional plateau capacity, in turn, tilts towards the maximum as well.  

The IOCs: Adjustment Of The Mindset.

The attitude and response of IOCs has been moving in distinct though not clearly demarcated phases from skepticism to consent, as if there were a crack in the dominant mindset affecting their attitude and behavior. Up to the eve of the first bid event on 30 June, IOCs expressed skepticism about the bidding terms and questioned the feasibility and wisdom of such action for petroleum upstream sector. “There’s always been a risk this won’t lead to anything – but we’re still going to go ahead,” said an oil company executive.¹⁰  

Nevertheless, all qualified IOCs participated in the biding process by attending various meetings and workshops, and thus managed to extract important concessions from the Ministry of Oil, that rendered the related contracts in contravention of Iraq’s best interest as previously analyzed by this author when assessing the related model contracts pertinent to the bid round.

Having secured critical concessions from the ministry, the 22 IOCs which took part in bidding event made their offers with one common feature: all their PPTs and RFs were higher, to varying degrees, than those offered by the ministry. While the offered higher PPTs were, though puzzling, welcomed as good news for the ministry, the higher RFs were rejected. The ministry requested that IOCs reconsider and resubmit their offers and accept the ministry’s RFs. Except for BP/CNPC in its offer for Rumaila oil field, the remaining IOCs declined to make any meaningful reduction in their RF in order to secure a deal. They moved, therefore, from skepticism to rejection.

In the immediate aftermath of the bid ceremony IOCs, their lobbyists and the media began a concerted campaign accusing the ministry of being unreasonable by dictating tough conditions, and complaining about (and also criticizing) the Chinese oil companies for being state supported, and thus able to cut the deal with BP. Petroleum commentators considered the event as a failure, a fiasco, a dud, and so on, and thus put the blame squarely on the ministry’s RF: “Oil industry executives and analysts described this [$2/B] as a shockingly low price, given the political and legal uncertainties of doing business in Iraq.” ¹¹ Acordingly Iraq was asked to “be prepared to soften some of its terms.” ¹²

This ‘blaming game’ phase lasted for a while, then signals of serious reflection began to emerge, with some saying that IOCs should not leave Iraqi oil to be dominated by China (“That fear of competition [from the Chinese or the other national oil corporations] has led to the conclusion that the risks of staying out of Iraq are greater than the risks of going into Iraq.” ¹³ ). Thus companies began revising their economics and assumptions, probably arriving at the apparent conclusion: if BP/CNPC can do it so could we. This was coupled with renewed recognition of the strategic importance of Iraq’s upstream petroleum and what this represents in terms of lucrative business opportunities: “Very few such places are open to foreign participation, regardless of the terms that oil companies are willing to accept.” ¹⁴

Such reflection and revision has led the IOCs to come to the original position of the Ministry of Oil and finally conceded to its proposal. Hence four IOCs – BP, CNPC, Lukoil and ConocoPhillips – have moved from skepticism to acquiescence, and this has set in motion the domino effects for other IOCs.  

Ministry Of Oil: No More Concessions

On its part, the Ministry of Oil had made enough and serious concessions to the IOCs that, in the opinion of this author, had led into having model contracts with so many flaws and inadequacies, that in their totality could not be to the best interest of the Iraqi people.¹⁵ Any further concessions, especially after the widely known RFs, could be seen by many as tantamount to political suicide and lack of patriotism. Nevertheless, the ministry seems to have adopted a somewhat ‘positional’ negotiation strategy by sticking to its own terms in the hope of ‘getting IOCs to say yes without giving-in.’  Such strategy is akin to the analysis I suggested above among the Ministry of Oil options discussed above.

The ministry’s learning curve and its gradualist approach to minimize the RF seems to be working well so far. From Ahdab through Rumaila to Zubair, and probably to West Qurna 1 also, the RF/B of additional production has declined from $3/B to $2/B to $1.90/B respectively. This could also indicate an emerging ‘benchmarking’ for Iraqi upstream petroleum opportunities, which IOCs have to observe, digest and learn to live with, by modifying their economic assumptions, calculations and business strategies, though some had expressed fears that such a benchmark would become a reality eventually.¹⁶

Reduced RF: Clarification Needed

As mentioned above, BP/CNPC had reduced their RF from $3.99/B to $2.00/B to secure the Rumaila oilfield deal. For West Qurna 1, Lukoil/ConocoPhillips expressed readiness to reduce its RF from $6.49/B to $1.90/B, ExxonMobil/Shell was reported to have accepted also to follow suit and reduce its RF further from $3.70/B to $1.90/B, and the Eni-led consortium reduced their RF from $4.80/B, to $4.40/B and finally to $2.00/B for the Zubair oilfield. Other IOCs could reduce their RF, but so far no confirmation was made.

These announced reductions are very substantive in both absolute and proportional terms, compared with their original offers. This is a matter that deserves very serious examination and careful analysis. However, what is really important is for the Ministry of Oil not only to show satisfaction and feel comfortable, but also to have the responsibility, as part of the learning process, to ensure three important matters:

• First, to request from all consortiums the ‘3Cs’ – clear, comprehensive and convincing explanations of how could they managed to reduce their RF by such significant margins, the cost structure, the economics and the premises upon which the original and the revised RF were based upon etc. The prolonged development partnership that could last more than 20 years for each oilfield entails full transparency from the contracted IOCs to enhance confidence and reduce potential conflicts. The IOCs must, therefore, explain how is it possible for them to make such unprecedented reductions in their remuneration fees.  

• Second, the ministry has to begin from now to enhance the professional capacities pertinent to accounting, auditing and verification of accounts related to these contracts. It could be even more advisable that such a body be an independent entity outside the ministry to ensure complete insulation from IOCs’ influence. The main purpose for such precautionary measures and capacity development is to ensure that the reduction in the RF will not be recaptured through other means during the contract period. It should be mentioned at this juncture that the model contract for these oil fields suffers from serious loopholes and flaws in the accounting, invoicing and verifications procedures that could provide opportunities for costly financial irregularities (MEES, 27 July).  

• Third, the ministry has to provide full, complete and accurate answers and explanations for the claim made by Eni Chief Executive Paulo Scaroni, who reportedly said: “We cut our fee (but) the whole structure of the contract has been changed… There has been a sweetening of other elements to the point that this contract is meeting our requirements in terms of return on investment.” ¹⁷    What are these changes in the contract, what is this sweetening, and were they offered also to others or only to the Eni-led consortium?  

Strategic Significance Vs Circumstantial Challenges

Iraq’s petroleum upstream sector has important strategic worth and significance, but also faces severe and daunting challenges, mostly in the form of temporary and/or circumstantial weaknesses. Briefly stated, strategic significance includes the number of geological structures, proven reserves, probable reserves/oil in place, geographical proximity, multiplicity of export outlets, oil and gas (free and associated), historical aspects of the industry, size of the fields (implication on economies of scale, access to petroleum and business opportunities), infrastructure availability (with need for modernization), partnership potential in downstream petroleum inside and outside Iraq, and costs (capital and operating).   

Iraq has additional ‘tactical’ advantage, which could be used to further and consolidate its strategic strength, and improve the contractual conditions for the best interests of Iraq. The former regime had concluded six contracts in attempts to break international sanctions. These were unilaterally suspended, but legally may be still enforceable since related laws enacted then are still valid.

The contract related to Ahdab with China’s CNPC was renegotiated and thus was converted from a production sharing agreement (PSA) to a service contract. Iraq could renegotiate the remaining contracts on much improved terms compared with those for Ahdab, taking into considerations the qualitative aspects of the related fields. In other words Iraq should develop a differentiated strategy commensurate with the significance of the related oil field. Once this is done, then they could constitute the baseline for any future contracts involving IOCs, and thus consolidate Iraq’s negotiation position and enhance its strategic strength.

Circumstantial challenges include security, political uncertainty, the predictability of legal frameworks, manpower and human resources, the brain drain (this can turn out to be a strategic asset for private sector contributions, or returning or even working with the IOCs), corruption, management problems, the relation between the executive and the legislative branches of government, and the stalemate within the Council of Representatives (COR). These are recognized and very daunting challenges.

Most of the debate, especially within the pro-IOCs media and a few Iraqi oil professionals, shows a tendency to inflate the magnitude of the circumstantial challenges and assume their continued existence for the long term. In the meantime very little attention and weight is given to the strategic considerations of Iraq’s vast petroleum resources. In consequence, the strategic strengths are unfairly undermined by exaggerated challenges that are of a short to medium term nature, especially when discussing the outcome of the first bidding round and the call for softer terms in the second bid round.¹⁸

Through Lukoil/ConocoPhillips’ latest move, the recognition of Iraq’s petroleum upstream sector’s strategic importance is partially restored, and this has induced other IOCs to acknowledge the same while refraining from unduly inflating current challenges at the expense of long term strategic worth.   

What Are The Implications For Domestic Politics?

This latest development from the IOCs, after 100 days of procrastination, has implications on the domestic political scene as well. The move could be seen or presented as a triumph for the Ministry of Oil and its chief, Husain al-Shahristani, bearing out a correct (tough) approach and strategy to deal with the IOCs. In a sense it could be considered as a delayed success for both the ministry and the minister. And this has further implication for the political future of the minister himself, since the latest developments could convert what had been seen as “political liability” into clear “political asset”.

Recent news indicate that Dr Shahristani seems to have been put on the sidelines as a possible candidate for the same ministerial portfolio if Mr Maliki wins the January 2010 election, or even as the one who draws the parameters’ bottom lines for the second bid round.¹⁹ News also indicates a possible shift in alliance of Dr Shahristani’ towards the Al-Jaffari bloc, the Iraqi National Alliance, in return for securing the oil ministry for him again if the latter bloc wins.²⁰  

Renewed confidence in Dr Shahristani by the PM would strengthen his position with the IOCs and enhance his political scores domestically with any winning blocs in the January election. On the other hand, he was asked to appear before the House of Representatives on 27 October, and possibly this time might face tougher opposition and a vote of no confidence.    

Regardless of the fate of Dr Shahristani, or where will he end up next January, the position of the ministry has undoubtedly been enhanced, especially against those, both Iraqis and others, who called upon the ministry to “soften” its terms and be ready “to pay more”, particularly for the forthcoming bid round. Obviously, the latest actions by IOCs after the Lukoil/ConocoPhillips move suggest otherwise. The writing on the wall is almost done, and the benchmarks for oil field remuneration fees are emerging. Moreover, the ministry could take this opportunity and suggests necessary steps to improve the contractual terms that are not to the best interest of the Iraqi people, as maintained by this author (MEES, 27 July 2009).

Notes:

1.  http://www.energyintel.com/PubHome.asp?publication_ID=112 (Accessed 11 August 2009).

2.  http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article195529.ece (Accessed 9 October 2009).

3.  Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, ‘Lessons To Be Learned From Iraq’s First Bidding Round’, (MEES, 17 August).

4. Fouad al-Ameer, (2009), ‘Notes on HOA Between Shell and MoO’, http://www.al-ghad.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/shell-book-study-arabic.pdf (in Arabic); and Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, ‘Iraqi-Shell Gas Deal: Who Occupies the Driver’s Seat?’, posted on Energy Intelligence  http://www.energyintel.com/PubHome.asp?publication_ID=112, also reposted on Iraq Oil Forum , http://www.iraqoilforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/ahmad-musa-jiyad-iraqi-shell-gas-deal-who-occupies-the-drivers-seat.pdf 

5.  http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?document_id=635471 (Accessed 13 October 2009).

6..http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUKLD35800420091013?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=11564 (Accessed 13 Oct 2009).

7.  UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report’, (2007), page 117.

8.  Florence C Fee, ‘Russia and Iraq: The Question of the Russian Oil Contracts’, (MEES, 7 April 2003).

9.  http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article187531.ece (Accessed 8 September 2009), and http://en.rian.ru/business/20090411/121066041.html (Accessed 11 April 2009).

10.  http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?document_id=627241 (Accessed 27 June 2009).

11.  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8db08786-672b-11de-925f-00144feabdc0.html (Accessed 6 July 2009).

12.  http://www.meed.com/commentary/2009/07/baghdad_must_soften_oil_terms.html (Accesseed 16 July 2009).

13.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8130791.stm (Accessed 9 July 2009).

14.  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8db08786-672b-11de-925f-00144feabdc0.html (Accessed 6 July 2009),

15.  Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, ‘Preliminary Assessment Of Iraq’s GSDPC Contract’, (MEES, 27 July).

16.  http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?document_id=635471 (Accessed 13 October 2009).

17. http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUKLD35800420091013?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=11564  (Accessed 13 Oct 2009).

18.  Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, ‘Development Determinants of Upstream Petroleum Sector in Iraq’, presentation to the 7^th Middle East & North Africa Oil & Gas Conference, Imperial College, University of London, 28-29 September 2009.

19.  http://en.aswataliraq.info/?p=119054 (Accessed 16 September 2009).

20.  ‘Iraq: Maliki and the Struggle Over the Oil Ministry’, Tactical Newswires , 2 October 2009.

© Copyright MEES 2009.