Mon, Nov 23, 2009, 06:44 GMT
 
Log In  Username   Password    Forgot your password? 
   Home   |  Charting   |  Energy Tables   |  Budgets   |  zawya
 
MEES@zawya search
Search MEES  MEES & zawya     
  Edition 
 
Political Comment (2 November 2009)
MEES
02 November 2009 Volume 52, Issue 44 - POLITICAL COMMENT
 

Political Comment (2 November 2009)

Suicide attacks in Baghdad have cast doubt on the Iraqi authorities' ability to guarantee security in the absence of American troops. Palestinian President Mahmud 'Abbas has abandoned attempts to reach a modus vivendi with Hamas and unilaterally set a 24 January date for elections in the West Bank and (theoretically) Gaza. Iran has replied to the latest international plan to ship its uranium abroad for enrichment .

More Bombings In Baghdad

The government’s reaction to the 25 October suicide bombings in central Baghdad which killed some 150 people and wounded more than 500 was different in two respects from its response to the 19 August attacks (which caused some 100 deaths). Firstly, no-one accused Syria of direct involvement with the Ba'thists and al-Qa'ida members generally held responsible. (Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, for example, blamed “black hands who are covered in the blood of the Iraqi people” and seek “to cause chaos in the nation, hinder the political process and prevent the parliamentary election.”) And secondly, when the Iraqis sought international assistance via Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari on 26 October, it took the form of asking the Security Council to nominate “a senior international envoy to come to Iraq and evaluate the degree of interference targeting stability in Iraq” rather than the independent international commission of inquiry demanded after the August attack. Since US State Department spokesman Ian Kelly promptly announced that “we would support the idea of the UN appointing a senior official to go into Iraq and look into these very serious allegations,” it was no surprise that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced on 28 October that “I will send assistant secretary general Oscar Fernandez-Taranco to Iraq for preliminary consultations related to Iraq’s security and sovereignty.” However Mr Ban was at pains to stress that his envoy would not be launching an investigation, saying that any formal inquiry would need “a clear mandate by the Security Council.”

From a certain angle, the Americans’ prompt endorsement of the proposal to send a UN envoy might be seen as an attempt to improve Mr Maliki’s chances in the January elections, which – since he is running on a platform that emphasizes security and secular nationalism (in that order) – are clearly at risk if the bombing campaign continues. Conversely, any deterioration in the security environment in Iraq threatens to reopen the confessional fault lines in Iraqi society, a development which could obviously impact the Americans’ plans to redeploy by mid-2010 and withdraw altogether by the end of 2011.

'Abbas Sets Election Date

In a move which probably signals the demise of Egyptian attempts to end to the rift at the heart of the Palestinian movement by mediating a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian President (and Fatah leader) Mahmud 'Abbas on 23 October called parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 January. Certainly Hamas reacted badly to the move, with spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri calling it “a fatal blow to reconciliation efforts and a prolonging of divisions” and accusing Mr 'Abbas of bowing “to American pressures not to reconcile with Hamas unless we recognize the Quartet conditions” (which are that Hamas should recognize Israel’s right to exist and renounce violence). Theoretically, of course, Mr 'Abbas’ decision applies to Gaza as well as the West Bank, but in reality his writ does not run in Gaza, from which Fatah was expelled by Hamas in 2007, as a Hamas spokesman made clear on 28 October when he said that the call for elections was illegal and that “any preparations, any committees, any collecting of names will be regarded as an illegal action that we will pursue.” There is a distinct risk, therefore, that Mr 'Abbas’ decision will perpetuate rather than narrow the rift in Palestinian ranks (and provide the Israelis with just the excuse they need to stave off peace negotiations while expanding settlements). Some observers believe there is room for a compromise involving delaying the elections until the summer, but there is one fly in that ointment: according to one Palestinian jurist, Mr 'Abbas, having issued a presidential decree, cannot delay the election without the consent of parliament – and the Palestinian parliament is at present incapacitated by the split between Fatah and Hamas.

Iran Replies To P5+1 Plan

It was probably too much to expect that the Iranians would give a straight answer to the proposal by the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany) to send most of Tehran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia and France for further processing and return it to Iran to fuel a reactor in Tehran by the 23 October deadline set by the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Muhammad al-Baradi’i. And sure enough, it was not until 29 October that Mr Baradi’i was able to announce that he had received “an initial response from the Iranian authorities to his proposal” and that he “is engaged in consultations with the government of Iran as well as all relevant parties with the hope that agreement on his proposal can be reached soon.” That hope looks unlikely to be realized, since although the details of Iran’s response have not been officially disclosed, it was widely reported that the Iranians were seeking two key changes in the P5+1 plan: to ship out their LEU in small, staggered amounts rather than in one lot by the end of the year; and to import fuel for the Tehran reactor from foreign suppliers simultaneously. These conditions are likely to prove unacceptable to the P5+1 since they mean that Iran would retain sufficient uranium, if enriched to 90%, to make a bomb. At the same time, however, Iran’s declared commitment in principle to the framework of the deal leaves the door open to further talks and probably closes it on any further sanctions in the near future, particularly as far as the Russians and Chinese are concerned.  In other words, if the Iranians are playing for time, they are succeeding. But the question remains how much time is left, and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner reminded everyone of the dangers inherent in the current stand off when he told the London Daily Telegraph on 26 October that Israel “will not tolerate an Iranian bomb. We know that, all of us…That is why we must decrease the tension and solve the problem. Hopefully we are going to stop this race to a confrontation. There is the time Israel will offer us before reacting, because Israel will react as soon as they know clearly that there is a threat.”

Charles Snow

© Copyright MEES 2009.

 
© Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) 2009.
 
Printer-friendly format
 
 
Site is optimised for viewing with Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator v4 and above. Screen is optimised for viewing at 1024 x 768.
Copyright © 2009 ABQ Zawya Ltd. and Middle East Economic Survey. All rights reserved.
 About MEES@zawya | User Agreement | Home